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ABSTRACT
This dissertation covers the topics of substance abuse, crime, health insurance, and child mal-
treatment.
Demand-side approaches should be strongly considered when attempting to combat America’s
illegal drug problems. Implementing an identification strategy that leverages variation driven by
substance-abuse-treatment facility openings and closings measured at the county level, estimations
show that substance-abuse-treatment facilities reduce both violent and financially motivated crimes
in an area. These effects are particularly pronounced for relatively serious crimes.
There is a role the employment relationship plays in determining the provision of health ben-
efits at the establishment level. Using restricted data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-
Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) and the Coarsened Exact Matching technique, the analysis ex-
tends previous studies by testing the relationships between premium costs, employment relation-
ships, and the provision of health benefits between 1999 and 2012. Both establishment- and state-
level union densities increase the likelihood of employers providing health plans, while right-
to-work legislation depresses the provision. Furthermore, state-level union density reduces the
adverse impact of premium costs. These results indicate that the declining provision of health ben-
efits is in part driven by the transformation of the employment relationship in the United States and
that labor unions remain a critical force in sustaining employment sponsored healthcare coverage
over the past two decades.
Child maltreatment is vastly underreported. School attendance takes children out of the home
and places them under the supervision of educators trained to notice symptoms of abuse and ne-
glect. Using state-age level enrollment data, estimations show that school attendance increases
maltreatment reporting by 77%. This increase stems solely from reports initiated by educators
with no evidence that these reports crowd out reporting from other entities. The effect is not
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally the branch of health economics studies aspects of the healthcare system or the
behaviors of individuals that affect their health. Recently, using the broadest possible definition,
health economics has covered a multitude of different topics including human capital development,
child welfare, moral hazard, violent crimes and more. Even with the vast subject areas under
a loosely defined scope of health economics, all studies investigate societal problems and bring
forth a meaningful and actionable solutions. The three chapters in this dissertation consist of three
distinct studies under a broad definition of health economics.
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation the problem presented deals with America’s drug epidemic
and how we should go about alleviating the many known issues that come along with it. Over
the past few decades, the U.S. government’s drug control policy has been focused on supply-side
interventions such as interdiction, eradication, source-country control, and law enforcement. This
chapter looks into a demand-side intervention coming in the form of substance abuse treatment,
more specifically substance abuse treatment facilities at the county level. We link these facilities
to agency level crime data from the FBIs Uniform Crime Report. We show that treatment facilities
built in the previous year reduce violent crimes as well as financially motivated crimes in the
current year. We further show that the benefit of the facilities far outweigh the costs associated
with building and maintaining them.
With the current national attention being placed on how we should go about implementing
an all-inclusive health insurance system, it is vital that we understand the main components that
make up the deciding factors of where and how individuals receive their health insurance plans.
Chapter 3 looks into the employment relationship as a determining factor for employer sponsored
health insurance using the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey Insurance Component provided
by the U.S. Census Bureau. With nearly half of Americans being covered by employment-based
health insurance and a large portion of the workforce being under union contracts, it is critical that
policy makers take into account the role employment relationships play in determining employer
1
sponsored health insurance.
The last chapter investigates the problem of underreporting for child maltreatment incidents.
Official rates of maltreatment only capture around 1 in 10 victims. The reason for this vast level
of underreporting is that children can only be reported for maltreatment if they are visible to po-
tential reporters. School attendance places children out of the home and under the supervision of
educators that are mandatory reporters of child maltreatment and are trained to notice symptoms
of abuse and neglect. Do to this large increase in public visibility I show that maltreatment re-
porting greatly increases whenever children begin to attend school. This chapter shows that if a
society wants to increase their level of maltreatment reporting they need to focus on policies that
will increase maltreated children’s visibility to potential reports.
2
2. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT CENTERS AND LOCAL CRIME
2.1 Introduction
Drug-induced deaths in the United States have increased 280 percent since 1999 and now
represent the largest major category of external causes of death by a wide margin: there were
47,055 deaths due to drug overdoses in 2014 compared to 32,675 due to motor vehicle accidents.1
These facts underscore a growing need to understand how to reduce drug-related harms. Towards
this end, a large body of work has shown that policies targeting the supply of illicit drugs are rarely
effective.2 In contrast, recent work indicates that expanding access to substance-abuse-treatment
(SAT) facilities significantly reduces severe drug abuse, as measured by drug-induced mortality
[11]. While this evidence highlights that investments in SAT can improve outcomes for some
individuals, it does not necessarily reflect a broad-based benefit for communities that might be
considering making such investments. In this paper we fill this important gap in the literature by
estimating the effects of SAT facilities on homicide rates, which are especially high in urban areas,
other violent crimes, and property crimes.3
There are several mechanisms through which SAT facilities may affect local crime. As outlined
in Goldstein’s [12] influential tripartite conceptual framework for the drugs-violence nexus, drugs
may affect violence through psychopharmacological effects, economically compulsive effects, and
systemic effects. In these terms, SAT could be expected to reduce violence by: (i) reducing the
use of drugs that lead to aggressive behavior (though there may be some offsetting effects caused
by withdrawal), (ii) by reducing conflicts associated with financially motivated crimes committed
by addicts seeking funds to buy drugs, and (iii) by reducing violence among and against those
Reprinted with permission from "Substance Abuse Treatment Centers and Local Crime" by Samuel R. Bondurant,
Jason M. Lindo, and Isaac D. Swensen. Journal of Urban Economics, Volume 104, Pages 124–133, March 2018 by
Elsevier.
1See [1] and [2]
2See for instance [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], and [10].
3In 2012, the homicide rate was 7.4 per 100,000 in central metropolitan counties compared to 4.1 per 100,000 in
other counties. These statistics are based on the Uniform Crime Reports data described in detail in Section 2.3.
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associated with the drug trade.4 Moreover, drug-abuse treatment may reduce gun carrying through
all three of these mechanisms, which could serve to reduce the amount—and intensity—of violence
in communities. It is also important to keep in mind that a relatively large share of drug users have
mental health problems that contribute to their addiction and to violent behaviors [17, 18]. As
such, we could expect SAT to reduce violence because it can itself include—or can direct patients
towards—treatment for underlying mental health problems that contribute to violence [17, 19].
Finally, SAT treatment may reduce criminal activity through positive spillover effects on friends
and family members of those receiving treatment.
Although these mechanisms highlight how SAT facilities can reduce crime through their effect
on drug abuse, there are other mechanisms through which we might expect SAT facilities to in-
crease local crime. Featuring prominently in not-in-my-backyard arguments against SAT facilities
is the notion that such facilities pose risks by drawing into the area individuals who have relatively
high rates of crime perpetration (drug users). Going beyond the idea of shifting crime perpetration
from one place to another, SAT facilities could increase crime by altering the social and environ-
mental context faced by drug users. That is, by altering the types of people and places that they
encounter and with which they interact.
In this study we contribute to this policy debate by quantifying the effects of SAT facilities on
crime. Specifically, we use annual county-level data on the number of SAT facilities to evaluate
the degree to which crime rates change when SAT facilities open and close. We consider vari-
ous crime outcomes measured over time at the county and law-enforcement agency level, based
on data from the National Center for Health Statistics and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting
Program. These panel data allow us to include a rich set of fixed effects (county/agency and state-
by-year) and control variables (demographics, various measures of economic conditions, and law
enforcement presence) in our models, so the estimates are identified based on plausibly exogenous
variation. Several ancillary analyses support the validity of this research design, including analy-
4Prior studies have documented causal effects of drug activity on community violence by exploiting variation in
drug use induced by price shocks [13, 14] and by exploiting variation in the timing with which specific drugs became
available across different cities [15, 16].
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ses that demonstrate that outcomes in an area change after but not before the number of facilities
change.
Our approach shifts the focus from the effects of SAT on those who receive treatment to the
effects of SAT facilities on the communities they serve. This allows us to make several contribu-
tions. First, we consider outcomes that tend to be beyond the scope of randomized control trials
(RCTs), which are limited by small samples, short follow-up periods, and the potential for false
reporting. In particular, our approach allows us to consider severe-but-infrequent outcomes (e.g.,
homicide) and behaviors that individuals are likely to conceal (e.g., sexual assault). Second, our es-
timates reflect the effects of SAT on patients and the spillover effects onto the broader community,
inclusive of any spillover effects on nearby friends and family and on the market for illegal drugs.
In so doing, our estimates will allow for more comprehensive cost-benefit considerations. Third,
whereas the nature of RCTs tends to require the use of small localized samples, which may have
limited external validity, our use of administrative data allows us to obtain estimates that reflect the
effects of SAT facilities across the United States.
Our analysis reveals significant and robust evidence that expanding access to SAT through
additional treatment facilities reduces local crime. The effects appear to be particularly pronounced
for relatively serious violent and financially motivated crimes: homicides, aggravated assaults,
robbery, and motor vehicle theft. We do not find significant effects on more frequent but less
serious crimes (simple assault, burglary, and larceny), nor do we find a significant effect on sexual
assault. We show that the estimated effect on homicides is present across two different sources of
homicide data and that they are concentrated in highly populated areas.5
Despite the various contributions of our research described above, there are some limitations
that bear noting. First, our empirical approach, which focuses on county- and law-enforcement-
agency-level aggregates, implies that we cannot separate the effects of SAT facilities on those
who receive treatment from the effects of SAT facilities on the broader community. Our use of
5In an earlier version of this study [20], we updated Swensen [11] analysis and showed that the impacts on drug
abuse—as measured by drug-induced mortality—are readily apparent in an analysis that uses the same years of data
as our analysis of crime. These results indicate a 0.50 percent decline in drug-induced mortality rates associated with
an additional SAT facility in a county, a bit larger than the estimated effect of 0.42 percent reported in [11].
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aggregate data also implies that we cannot separately identify effects for areas in a county that
are nearer versus farther from a SAT facility. That said, we view these as a reasonable tradeoffs
in order to be able to speak to the effects on the community as a whole. Second, while there is
significant variation across SAT facilities in the types of treatment that they offer and in the number
of patients they can treat, our estimates will reflect an average of the effects of these facilities.
Finally, openings and closings of SAT facilities are not random. While this has the potential to
compromise our ability to identify causal effects, our ancillary analyses, which are discussed in
detail in subsequent sections, demonstrate that it is unlikely in light of our empirical strategy.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Substance Abuse and Treatment
According to the National Survey of Drug Use and Health over 21.5 million people in the U.S.
are classified as having a substance-use disorder [21].6 A high incidence of substance abuse is
also apparent in crime perpetration, with 40 percent of convicted violent criminals being under the
influence of alcohol and nearly 60 percent of all arrestees testing positive for some illicit substance
at the time of arrest.7 The annual societal costs of drug abuse solely in terms of drug-related crime
are estimated at over 56 billion dollars.8
Though substance-abuse treatment is a promising avenue to reduce these costs, treatment rates
for those in need remain very low. In 2014, 85 percent of those abusing or dependent on an illicit
substance did not receive treatment and 91 percent of those abusing or dependent upon alcohol did
not receive treatment. Moreover, despite the prevalence of alcohol and drugs among arrestees, 70
percent of arrestees have never been in any form of drug or alcohol treatment [22]. Notably, recent
changes brought about by the Affordable Care Act are expected to increase coverage and take-up
of treatment [23, 24].
In this context, the number of substance-abuse treatment facilities may be a particularly rel-
6Based on criteria specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV).
7See https://ncadd.org/about-addiction/alcohol-drugs-and-crime.
8Estimates based on the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment counducted by the National Drug Intelligence
Center.
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evant policy parameter. In the United States, over 14,500 stand-alone treatment facilities are the
primary setting for delivery of substance-abuse treatment, offering a wide range of drug-treatment
programs and related services [25]. Local treatment centers most commonly offer outpatient care
to deliver treatment programs such as detoxification, methadone maintenance, regular outpatient,
adolescent outpatient, and drug-court programs [25]. For more serious substance-abuse problems,
facilities provide residential treatment in which clients temporarily live at the treatment site (e.g. in-
patient detoxification, chemical dependency programs, therapeutic communities). While treatment
programs vary substantially and often target particular demographic groups or specific drug addic-
tions, all treatment approaches share similar goals to mitigate the consequences of drug abuse and
encourage healthier lifestyles. According to the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (2015),
62 percent of individuals undergoing treatment reported receiving treatment for alcohol, 21 percent
reported receiving treatment for marijuana, 18 percent reported receiving treatment for pain reliev-
ers, 14 percent reported receiving treatment for cocaine, 13 percent reported receiving treatment
for heroin, and 11 percent reported receiving treatment for stimulants such as methamphetamines.
More broadly, the substance-abuse treatment industry includes profit, non-profit, and public
providers, the bulk of which (87 percent) are privately-owned facilities.9 Though the objective
functions of facilities may differ somewhat by ownership status and treatment focus, the decision
to open or close a treatment facility likely depends crucially on (i) a perceived need for treatment
providers or opportunities to improve upon currently offered treatment services and (ii) the abil-
ity to secure funding for treatment services from either public or private third-party payers [26].
Given the high need for addiction treatment and existing evidence of binding treatment capacity
constraints and long wait lists, the availability of funds is particularly relevant when considering
the predictors of facility openings and closings.10
9According to the 2013 National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services, 60 percent of facilities are non-
profit, 30 percent are for profit, and 10 percent are public.
10Evidence suggests that capacity concerns and being put on a wait list are important barriers to treatment enrollment
[27, 28, 29]. Relatedly, [30] analyze the effect of state legislation that reduces out-of pocket costs for mental health
and substance-abuse treatment and find a relatively small effect on treatment admissions. They argue that the effect on
admissions is muted, in part, because of treatment capacity constraints suggested by limited growth in the number of
treatment facilities and increasing treatment waiting periods.
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Unlike general health care, which relies on funding through insurance mechanisms, substance-
abuse treatment relies primarily on public funding in the form of federal block grants and state
subsidies. That said, recent mental health parity legislation and the rise of managed-care con-
tracts have increased the importance of public and private insurance revenue to providers [31, 32].
Assuming these sources of financing generally increase with drug abuse and related problems,
analyses of the effect of treatment provision on drug-related outcomes may understate the actual
effect of treatment.
2.2.2 Related Literature on SAT and Crime
An extensive literature has evaluated the relationship between substance-abuse treatment pro-
grams, drug related outcomes, and criminal activities, including some that use “the gold standard”
for empirical research, randomized control trials (RCTs). In a widely-cited meta analysis, Pren-
dergast et al. [33] reviewed 78 studies of SAT, 60 percent of which used random or quasi-random
assignment to treatment and 25 of which examined crime outcomes. They report that “drug abuse
treatment has both a statistically significant and a clinically meaningful effect in reducing drug
use and crime, and that these effects are unlikely to be due to publication bias.” The estimates
indicate an average 13 percent decline in criminal involvement as a result of treatment.11 More
recent reviews of specific treatment approaches provide consistent evidence that criminal involve-
ment declines during treatment and mixed evidence when considering longer-run crime outcomes
[34, 35].
The existing literature also adds insight into the efficacy of specific treatment settings in reduc-
ing drug-related crime. Some of the more convincing and consistent evidence comes from studies
evaluating prison-based drug treatment. This is partly due to the relative ease of employing a ran-
domized treatment design and the ability to consider recidivism rates rather than relying on self-
reported criminal activity.12 Summarizing the literature, Mitchel et al. [38] review 74 studies of
11Crime outcomes included self-reported crimes and official records on arrest, conviction and incarceration. As
such, this review includes evidence from crime outcomes during and after treatment.
12Treatment rates increased by 34 percent among state inmates and 90 percent among federal inmates from 1997-
2004 [36]. Core funding for these increases has come from the federal government through the Residential Substance
Abuse Treatment (RSAT) initiative and funding for drug courts through the Bureau of Justice Administration [37].
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prison-based treatment programs and conclude that substance-abuse treatment for inmates reduces
recidivism by 15 percent. Existing evidence also suggests that court-mandated treatment pro-
grams, which account for a third of all treatment admissions, can be effective in reducing crime.13
For instance, Wilson, Mitchell, and Mackenzie [39] identify and review 55 quasi-experimental and
experimental evaluations of drug courts. They concluded that court-referred treatment does lower
re-arrest rates though the estimated effects were notably smaller and less precise among evalua-
tions that employed randomization. They also find consistent evidence of declines in re-offending
both during and following court-referred treatment programs, however the estimated effects do
decay over time.
Together, this literature provides consistent evidence that treatment programs can reduce crime.
While these studies have made significant contributions to our knowledge, the merit of our study
is predicated on the notion that some of the most important questions about the effects of SAT are
only likely to be answered using alternative methods applied to observational data. In particular,
our study shifts the focus from the effects of SAT on those who receive treatment to the effects of
SAT facilities on the communities they serve and uses data that allow us to obtain estimates that
reflect the effects of SAT facilities on local-area crime across the United States.
To our knowledge only one other recent working paper attempts to consider the effects of SAT
on crime in such a comprehensive fashion. Wen, Hockenberry, and Cummings [40] consider the
effects of changes in SAT rates on property and violent crimes using data collected by the FBI that
span the United States. Their instrumental variables approach relies on the assumption that state
health insurance expansions (made possible through Health Insurance Flexibility and Account-
ability waivers) only relate to changes in crime through their impacts on SAT.14 This assumption
could be violated if, for example, expanding access to health insurance affects crime through its
impact on treatment for mental health problems or through its impacts on overall health and well
13 See [25] for a breakdown of admissions by treatment referral source.
14They also use as an instrumental variable state-level mandates requiring private group health plans to provide
benefits for substance-use disorder treatment that are no more restrictive than the benefits for medical insurance parity
mandates; however, it is always used in conjunction with the waiver expansion instrument, presumably due to a lack
of independent power.
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being. As all observational studies rely on fundamentally untestable assumptions, and as any body
of evidence is more compelling when similar results are documented using approaches that rely
on different assumptions, we view our work as an important contribution that complements this
prior study, which reports that increases in substance-use-disorder treatment significantly reduces
robbery, aggravated assault, and larceny.
2.3 Data
Following Swensen [11], we identify county-level changes in the number of substance-abuse
treatment facilities using data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP).
The CBP data reports the annual number of substance-abuse treatment clinics (a single physical
location) in each U.S. county for both outpatient and residential facilities from 1999-2012.15 Al-
though classified separately in the CBP data, residential and outpatient establishments often offer
both residential and outpatient treatment services with 90 percent of all admissions occurring in
an outpatient setting [25]. Therefore, estimating the effects separately for outpatient and resi-
dential facilities would not be informative as residential and outpatient services are not distinctly
identified. As such, we combine outpatient and residential classifications using the total count of
establishments as an indicator for county-level provision of substance-abuse treatment.
To estimate the effect of treatment facilities on local-area crime we merge CBP data with
several independent data sources for criminal activity. We use two datasets to investigate impacts
on homicides, one of which we also use to investigate a wide variety of crimes. First, we use annual
county-level mortality data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Multiple Cause
of Death Data to analyze homicides.16 We combine these data with county-year population counts
from the National Cancer Institutes’s Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (Cancer-SEER)
program to construct mortality rates. We also use these population data to create county-by-year
controls for demographic characteristics.17
15The following six-digit NAICS codes identify treatment establishments: 621420 —“Outpatient mental health and
substance abuse centers" and 623220—“Residential mental health and substance abuse facilities."
16NCHS homicides include deaths by another person with the intent to injure or kill. They do not include homicides
due to legal intervention, operations of war, or homicides from the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.
17As reported by [41], the Cancer-SEER population data are more accurate than data interpolated from the Census
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Our second source of crime data is based on the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which are a
compilation of crime statistics reported by local law-enforcement agencies across the United States
to the FBI. Specifically, we use the offenses known data from the Offenses Known and Cleared by
Arrests UCR segment. These data, which we will refer to as UCR Offenses Known, include the
most commonly reported violent and property crimes including criminal homicide, sexual assault,
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle theft. We focus on known offenses in
order to capture crimes that come to the attention of law enforcement, as opposed to alternative
data sets that are available but are restricted to crimes that have been cleared by arrest. We use
these data in conjunction with the UCR’s estimates of the population covered by an agency in a
given year to construct annual agency-level crime rates. We restrict our UCR sample to agencies
that cover a single county and agency-years in which agencies are reporting the full 12 months of
crime to the UCR program. We link the UCR agency-level data with county-level CBP data using
the primary county in which each municipality resides and calculate crime rates using the annual
reported population covered by each municipal agency.18
We restrict our analysis to U.S. counties with at least one treatment facility over the 1999-2012
time period and counties with available identifiers in the 48 contiguous states.19 The resulting
data include treatment facility, mortality, and crime data in 48 states, spanning 14 years. In Table
C.2 we present summary statistics for our sample, weighted by the relevant populations. CBP
data indicate that counties have a population-weighted average of 49.5 SAT facilities. Importantly,
there is substantial variation in the number of facilities with the average county experiencing 5.8
net facility openings and 3.7 net closings from 1999 to 2012, where a net opening is an observed
increase in the number of facilities from one year to the next and a net closing is defined similarly.
because they “are based on an algorithm that incorporates information from Vital statistics, IRS migration files, and
the Social Security database.”
18The UCROffenses Known data used in this study were collected and compiled by the Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
19Specifically, we drop all counties in HI and AK and combine counties that experience boundary changes over
time. This involves combining Adams, Broomfield, Boulder, Jefferson, and Weld in Colorado; Prince George’s and
Montgomery inMaryland; Gallatin and Yellowstone National Park inMontana; Craven and Carteret in North Carolina;
Alleghany and Clifton Forge in Virginia; Augusta and Waynesboro in Virginia; Bedford and Bedfort City in Virginia;
Halifax and South Boston City in Virginia; Prince William and Manassas Park in Virginia; Southampton and Franklin
in Virginia; and York and Newport News in Virginia.
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For reference, Table C.2 also shows summary statistics for each mortality and crime outcome used
in our analysis. Summary statistics for the control variables we use in our analysis are shown in
Table A.7.
2.4 Empirical Approach
We identify the effects of SAT facilities using year-to-year variation within counties driven by
facility openings and closings, controlling for state-by-year shocks common to areas within a state
in addition to time-varying county characteristics. As we analyze both county and agency-level
outcomes, we operationalize this strategy using a regression model that includes either county or
agency fixed effects in addition to state-by-year fixed effects and county-year covariates:
yast = Facilitiescs;t 1 + as + st + Xcst + ast;
where yast represents outcomes in area a (either county or agency) in state s in year t. We use log
rates to measure crime outcomes. We add one to all outcome counts before constructing log rates
to avoid dropping area-year observations for which the outcome would otherwise be undefined,
but we show that results of all of our analyses are similar if we instead simply focus on areas
that always have a positive count, with the sample being defined separately for each outcome
considered. We also show that results are similar using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
instead of adding one before taking the log of counts. In support of using a log transformation, we
have verified that Poisson models (where computationally feasible) yield very similar estimates.
Facilitiescs;t 1 represents the number of SAT facilities in county c in state s in year t-1, as
are area fixed effects, st are state-by-year fixed effects, and Xcst includes county unemployment
rates, the number of firm births, number of law enforcement officers per 100,000, and the fraction
of the county population that is: white, black, male, less than 10 years old, 10-19 years old, ...
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, 60-69 years old.20;21 Finally, ast is a random error term that we allow to be correlated within
a county across years, and across all counties in any given year by estimating two-way standard
errors following Cameron et al. (2011).22 To be clear, our measure of facilities is a county-level
measure even when we are considering crimes at the agency level. We also note that our main
results are based on regressions that weight by the relevant population size in order to improve
efficiency though we subsequently explore unweighted estimates.
Our focus on within-area variation accounts for fixed characteristics of areas (both observable
and unobservable) that may be correlated with the number of SAT facilities in a county and with
our outcomes of interest. For example, this approach will address the fact that there are inherent
differences between urban and rural counties. The inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects account
for aggregate time-varying shocks, such as aggregate economic conditions or changes in the na-
tional drug-control strategy.23 They also control for state-specific shocks such as changes in state
funding for law enforcement services. The controls for unemployment rates and firm births account
for the possibility that our outcomes of interest and treatment facilities may both be related to local
economic conditions. The controls for demographics account for the possibility that compositional
changes in a county’s population may affect outcomes and investments in SAT facilities.
Our empirical approach closely follows Swensen [11], who also conducts several ancillary
20County unemployment rates are from the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Firm births are the number of
firms reporting positive employment for the first time, as reported by the U.S. Census Statistics of U.S. Businesses. The
number of law-enforcement officers per 100,000 residents are calculated using the UCR agency-specific employment
reports available in the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) database. For our county level
analysis, we use aggregated agency-level data.
21Our choice to use the number of facilities in the prior year as opposed to the number per capita is supported by an
ancillary analysis of drug-induced mortality. Drug-induced mortality clearly responds to the number of facilities (as
previously shown in [11]), less so to facilities per capita. This is likely to be in part explained by larger areas tending
to have larger facilities. In any case, this finding supports the idea that the number of facilities is a stronger predictor
of utilization than a per-capita measure. We have also investigated models that include the number of facilities squared
but never find its corresponding parameter estimate to be statistically significant, whether evaluating drug-induced
mortality or crime outcomes. This suggests that any diminishing returns that may exist are not large enough to be
detected using our data and identification strategy.
22That is, we estimate two-way standard errors clustered on counties and years. This approach yields more conser-
vative estimates than estimates that solely cluster on counties, reflecting that there are unobserved shocks to outcomes
that span counties.
23For instance, state-by-year fixed effects control for nationwide effects of the substantial increases in federal fund-
ing for substance-abuse treatment services for inmates through the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT)
initiative and funding for drug courts through the Bureau of Justice Administration.
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analyses in support of the validity of the research design for estimating effects on drug-induced
mortality. In particular, Swensen demonstrates that additional facilities lead to increases in treat-
ment admissions and that the effects of additional facilities are greatest for causes of death that are
most closely related to drug abuse.24 To address concerns regarding reverse causality, Swensen
plots drug-induced mortality rates leading up to and following changes in the number of facilities
and finds no visual evidence of changes in drug-related mortality prior to changes in the number
of facilities. Furthermore, his estimates from models that consider additional lags and leads of
treatment facilities show that the previous- and current-year changes in the number of facilities
is significantly related to drug-induced mortality, but that drug-induced mortality is not related to
the number of facilities in future periods.25 In a similar fashion, we estimate a version of Eq. (1)
that also considers the effect of the number of facilities in the current, previous and subsequent
years on the outcomes that are the focus of this paper. The results of this analysis, discussed in
more detail below, indicate that changes in the number of treatment facilities are also not driven by
recent changes in crime.
We note that a third of all treatment admissions are court-ordered, often as an alternative to
incarceration. This is potentially important because links from increased crime to increased incar-
ceration to increased SAT facilities could cause our empirical strategy to understate the reductions
in crime generated by SAT facilities. Alternatively, links from increased incarceration to reduced
crime (through incapacitation effects) and to SAT facilities could cause our empirical strategy to
overstate the reductions in crime generated by increased SAT facilities. While we cannot rule out
either of these possibilities, we note that any such changes would have to be happening differen-
tially across counties within the same states to generate bias (because we control for state-by-year
24Swensen uses data on admissions into facilities receiving public funding to offer “proof of concept” that in-
creases in treatment facilities leads to a change in an underlying factor associated with treatment. Notably, other
mechanisms—including perceptions toward treatment or factors influencing the quality and accessibility treatment—
may also contribute to declines in substance abuse as treatment services expand.
25Swensen also estimates models using demand-side characteristics to predict treatment facility openings in order to
offer insight into the degree to which treatment provision responds to changes in the demand for addictive substances.
His results suggest that the number of treatment facilities varies directly with measures that proxy for the demand for
addictive substances, he argues that not adequately accounting for these correlations would understate the effect of an
additional treatment facility on drug-related mortality.
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fixed effects). We also note that persistent shocks generating these sorts of relationships would
be expected to generate significant links between current crime rates and future levels of SAT.
Reassuringly, we do not find evidence of any such links.
2.5 Estimated Effects on Crime
2.5.1 Homicides
Before turning to estimates that are based on Uniform Crime Reports data, we begin with an
analysis of homicide deaths recorded in NCHS mortality data. Though these also include justified
homicides, 94 percent are unjustified criminal homicides and, as such, they can shed light on
the degree to which treatment interventions affect the most serious and costly form of criminal
activity.26 The results of this analysis, shown in the first panel of Table A.2, provide causal evidence
that county-level homicide rates are reduced by SAT facilities. Specifically, the estimates indicate a
0.25 percent decline in intentional homicide death rates associated with an additional SAT facility.
These estimates are similar across specifications with limited control variables and richer sets of
control variables.
In the second panel of Table A.2 we investigate the effects on homicide rates using law-
enforcement-agency-level data from the UCR’s Offenses Known database. We estimate similar
models when using these data, just modifying them to reflect that they are agency-year data by
using agency fixed effects instead of county fixed effects and using agency covered population as
the denominator to construct homicide rates. Analyses of these data continue to indicate that SAT
facilities significantly reduce homicides in areas covered by municipal law-enforcement agencies,
though the estimates are somewhat smaller, indicating a 0.16 percent decline in intentional homi-
cide death rates associated with an additional SAT facility.27
26For a breakdown of justified and unjustified homicides in 2013, see https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide.
27In an earlier version of this study Bondurant et al. [20], we also investigated the impacts on homicides using the
UCR’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) database, an incident-level dataset that includes detailed information
on each homicide as voluntarily reported by agencies participating in the UCR program. The results of this the
analysis indicated that effects of SAT facilities on homicides are concentrated among homicide incidents in which the
relationship to the offender was unknown or in which the offender was a friend.
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2.5.2 Violent Crimes More Broadly
Having established that SAT facilities reduce the most costly of crimes (homicides), we next
consider the degree to which treatment facilities affect other types of violent crime. In Table A.3 we
show a detailed breakdown of the effects of SAT facilities on violent crimes based on analyses of
the UCROffenses Known data.28 While we focus our discussion below on the point estimates from
models with the richest set of controls (Column 5), we note that the estimated effects are similar
across specifications once state-by-year fixed effects and demographic controls are included as
covariates. The estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of other county-year control variables.
Across the first four panels of Table A.3, we sequentially report the estimated effects on violent
crimes of decreasing severity according to social cost estimates reported in McCollister et al. [43]:
homicides ($9,881,198 per incident), sexual assault ($264,854), aggravated assault ($117,722),
and simple assault.29 We defer our consideration of robbery until the next section where we focus
on financially motivated crimes. As mentioned above, the estimated effect on homicides indicates
a significant reduction caused by SAT facilities. While the point estimate for the effect on sexual
assault is also negative, suggesting that SAT facilities reduce sexual assault as well, it is not close
to being statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimated effect on aggravated assaults
also suggests a reduction in crime associated with SAT facilities, though this estimate is only
marginally statistically significant. Finally, the estimates suggest no effect on simple assaults.
2.5.3 Financially Motivated Crimes
Table A.4 shows the estimated effects on financially motivated crimes. We again sequentially
report the estimated effects on crimes of decreasing severity according to social cost estimates:
robbery ($46,541), motor vehicle theft ($11,849), burglary ($7,108), and larceny ($3,885). As
with the estimated effects on violent crimes, these estimates suggest more pronounced effects of
28In most cases each outcome represents a distinct incident as 85 percent of UCR incidents are single-offense
incidents, where an incident is a distinct time, place, victim (for crimes against the person), and offender. In cases of
multiple-offense incidents, agencies are instructed to report the most severe offense according to the UCR hierarchy
rule [42].
29Note that we have adjusted the cost estimates for inflation to put the amounts in 2016 dollars. MCollister et al.
[43] do not include estimates for simple assault.
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SAT facilities on relatively serious crimes. The point estimates indicate that a SAT facility reduces
robbery by 0.11 percent, motor vehicle theft by 0.12 percent, burglary by 0.05 percent, and larceny
by 0.06 percent. The estimated effects larceny are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
2.5.4 Assessing Endogeneity and Lag Structure
As discussed in Section 2.4, the main threat to the validity of our empirical strategy is the
possibility that changes in the number of facilities in an area might be driven by trends in the
outcomes we consider (or the correlates thereof) and/or recent shocks to the outcomes we consider
(or the correlates thereof). To the degree to which such trends and/or shocks occur at the state level
or relate to changing demographics, economic conditions, or the size of police forces, they should
be captured by state-year fixed effects and the control variables included in our analysis. As this is
fundamentally untestable, we propose a test of the validity of our identification strategy based on
examining the lead and lag structure of the estimated effects. Specifically, we estimate versions of
Eq. (1) that consider the link between our outcome variables and the number of SAT facilities in a
county in a future year.
We also expand on Eq. (1) to consider contemporaneous versus lagged measures of SAT fa-
cilities. We do so in order to evaluate our choice to focus on the number of facilities in the prior
year as our main variable of interest, a choice we made to avoid attenuation bias that would likely
be caused by the fact that newly opened (or closed) facilities would only affect counties for some
fraction of the year.
Table A.5 shows estimates of this type for all of the outcomes considered across tables 2
through 4. Specifically, it shows estimates based on our richest model while additionally con-
sidering the number of facilities in the current year and in the future year. Across the 9 outcomes
we consider, the estimated effects of the number of facilities one year in the future are never statis-
tically significant, even at the ten-percent level. We interpret these results as evidence that reverse
causality, or the possibility that changes in the number of SAT facilities may be driven by recent
changes in drug abuse and related outcomes, is not a major concern. As such, these results provide
support for a causal interpretation of our main results.
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These results also provide support for our focus on the lagged measure of facilities. In partic-
ular, where we see significant effects on outcomes, the number of treatment facilities in the prior
year has a stronger effect than the number of treatment facilities in a given year in all but one
instance. Moreover, the estimated effect of the number of treatment facilities in the current year
is usually not statistically significant, suggesting that the effects are more likely to be driven by
successful treatment as opposed to incapacitation effects.30
2.5.5 Alternative Empirical Approaches
As an additional test of the robustness of our estimates, in Panel A of Table A.6 we show the
estimated effects for each outcome based on the subset of areas for which the log outcome rate can
be defined in each year without adding one.31 For nearly all of the outcomes we consider, these
estimates are virtually the same as our main results in both statistical and economic significance.
Panel B of Table A.6 shows estimates that transform crime counts using the inverse hyperbolic
sine function as an alternative to adding one before taking the log.32 For all of the outcomes we
consider, this approach yields estimates that are very similar or larger in magnitude to our main
results.
Panel C of Table A.6 shows estimates that do not use population weights. Notably, the es-
timated effects on homicide are smaller in magnitude and no longer statistically significant at
the five-percent level in these unweighted results. As discussed in Solon et al. [44], differences
between weighted and unweighted estimates can reflect heterogeneity in the effects across high-
weight and low-weight observations (or high-population and low-population areas in our case).
To gain greater insight into such heterogeneity, we examine how our (weighted) estimates vary as
we exclude the largest 5 areas, the largest 10 areas, and so on.33 The results of this analysis are
30Further results along these lines are presented in Tables A.8 through A.10. In these tables, we explore models that
consider alternative lag and lead specifications including an additional lead indicator. The results of these analyses
lead to the same conclusions as in Table A.5.
31As such, the set of areas contributing to the estimates varies across outcomes, with fewer areas contributing to the
estimates focusing on rarer outcomes such as homicides.




33Recall that we are focusing on counties in our analysis based on death records and police agencies in our analyses
based on offenses known to police.
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shown in Table A.11. Consistent with there being significant effects on homicides for populous
areas but not for smaller areas, the estimates do eventually shrink to zero as we exclude more and
more large areas. However, the estimates using agency-level homicide reports, which offer a lot
more precision than the estimates based on county-level death records, continue to be statistically
significant even when we omit the largest 200 agencies. Along similar lines, in Table A.12, we
show the estimated effects on homicides if we only use the largest locations. Though the statistical
significance varies depending on how many agencies are included (ranging from 20 to 500) and on
whether the estimates are weighted, they routinely indicate that SAT facilities reduce homicides
for populous areas.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In the preceding sections, we document statistically and economically significant effects of
SAT facilities on several categories of crime. Our estimates of the effects on agency-level crime
indicate that an additional facility in a county reduces municipal rates of homicide, aggravated as-
sault, robbery, motor vehicle theft, and burglary; with homicide rates reduced by an average of 0.16
percent annually.34 In conjunction with social-cost-of-crime estimates from [43], our estimates in-
dicate that an additional SAT facility in a county reduces municipal crime costs by approximately
$475,642 per municipality.35 Given an average of six municipal governments in each county, this
suggests a decline in annual costs of county-level crime by approximately 2.85 million dollars for
34In an interesting contrast, Dobkin and Nicosia [8] evaluate a crackdown reducing methamphetamine consumption
over an 18-month period and do not find statistically significant effects on property or violent crime. Noting that 62
percent of SAT is for alcohol—and alcohol has been causally linked to crime by a number of studies including Carpen-
ter and Dobkin [45], Lindo et al. [46], and Anderson et al. [47], among many others—it could be that the effects that
we find on crime are driven by reductions in alcohol abuse. Moreover, Dobkin and Nicosia [8] find that the interven-
tion they evaluate substantially increased alcohol abuse, which could attenuate the effects they find on crime. Another
potential explanation for why we find statistically significant effects of expanding access to SAT on crime whereas
they find no statistically significant effects of methamphetamine use on crime could relate to power. In particular, the
effects of methamphetamine use on crime may be too small to be detected by their identification strategy. The 95
percent confidence interval for their estimated elasticity of homicides with respect to methamphetamine consumption
(as measured by hospital admissions) includes 0.078. This is not directly comparable to our estimates, but does not
seem at odds with our point estimate which indicates that an additional SAT facility in the county reduces municipal
homicide rates by 0.16 percent.
35Municipal cost calculations are based on a weighted average population of 315,030 and cost-of-crime estimates in
2016 dollars for homicides ($9,881,198 per incident), aggravated assault ($117,722), robbery ($46,541), motor vehicle
theft ($11,849), and burglary ($7,108).
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each additional facility.
These estimates suggest that reductions in crime account for a sizable share of the benefits of
SAT facilities. Updated estimates of the effects on county-level drug-related mortality reported in
Bondurant et al. [20] indicate that an additional SAT facility reduces drug-related mortality by 0.50
percent annually. Based on a value of 7 to 8 million dollars per expected life saved, the estimate
implies a decline in a county’s annual drug-related mortality costs by 4.2 to 4.8 million dollars.36;37
In total, these calculations suggest that the county-level benefits of an additional facility—in terms
of drug-related mortality and criminal activity—are between 7.05 and 7.65 million dollars. Reduc-
tions in crime account for approximately 40 percent of these benefits.
To compare these benefits to the annual costs of treatment at each facility, we can consider
the average number of annual treatment admissions (255) from the National Survey of Substance
Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS), and treatment modality-specific cost estimates from French
et al. [50].38 A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that the annual costs of treatment for a
SAT facility are approximately 1.1 million dollars.39 These calculations suggest that the benefits
of expanding treatment facilities far outweigh the associated treatment costs.
While our data do not allow us to establish a direct link between substance-abuse treatment and
incidents, the results of our analyses provide support for the idea that there are broad-based benefits
of SAT facilities in terms of public safety. This evidence is in contrast to not-in-my-backyard
arguments that have been used to hinder attempts to expand access to SAT through additional
facilities. That said, an important limitation of our research design is that it identifies effects of
having an additional SAT facility in the county, which could mask heterogeneous effects for areas
36This is based on 10.9 drug-related deaths per 100,000 and an average weighted county population of 1.09 million.
37Kniesner [48] suggest a 7 to 8 million dollar value of a statistical life (VSL) for health and safety regulation
cost-benefit analyses, which is consistent with median VSL estimates from meta analysis of existing VSL research
[49].
38Estimates from French et al. [50] include all treatment delivery costs related to personnel, supplies and materials,
contracted services, buildings and facilities, equipment, and miscellaneous items.
39We use the annual number of treatment admissions reported in Swensen [11] based on the 2002-2008 N-SSATS
data. More recent N-SSATS data do not include treatment admissions information. To calculate the total cost of
treatment at a SAT facility, we use the median of the cost bands reported for each modality in French et al. [50]
weighted by the proportion of total admissions accounted for by each modality as reported in the 2013 N-SSATS
reports.
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in a county that are nearer versus farther from such a facility. Assessing whether such heterogeneity
exists would seem to be an important avenue for future research.
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3. UNION, PREMIUM COST, AND THE PROVISION OF HEALTH BENEFITS
3.1 Introduction
Employment-based health plans have been the main channel through which most Americans
acquire their health care, but its coverage has been in decline in the past few decades. Between
1987 and 2017, the proportion of Americans who were covered by employment-based health plans
declined from 62.1% to 49%, a difference of 13.1 percentage points consisting of over 41 million
men, women, and their dependents who have access to health insurance through their own or a fam-
ily members employment [51]. While the Affordable Care Act has significantly reduced the unin-
sured population since 2013, particularly among low-income households [52], the employment-
based health plan remains the central pillar in the U.S. healthcare system. As such, the shrinkage
of employer-sponsored health plans has drawn significant attention.
A main driver of the decline in employment-based health insurance is that fewer workplaces
offer any health plans to their employees. Figure B.1 presents the percentage of private estab-
lishments that provided health insurance between 1999 and 2014. It shows that at the turn of the
century close to 60 percent of all U.S. private workplaces provided at least one health plan. The
number dwindled in the early 2000s and again in the aftermath of the Great Recession. In 2014,
only 47.5 percent of establishments provided any insurance. Many of these losses were concen-
trated in small workplaces which experienced the greatest relative declines in offers, whereas larger
workplaces tended to remain stable [53]. Furthermore, the downward trend underestimates the de-
terioration of employment-based health plans, as many providing employers adopt plans with more
restrictive healthcare networks and higher deductibles.
The predominant explanation of this downward trend is the growth of premium costs. A recent
report from the Kaiser Family Foundation [54] indicates that the cost of health insurance has been
on the rise. Between 2003 and 2016, the average annual health insurance premium for family
coverage doubled from $9,068 to $18,142. Furthermore, costs have often been cited as the most
22
important reason why firms do not provide health insurance. Several other studies also indicate that
a significant portion of the decline in insurance coverage could be attributed to the rise of premium
costs and the tendency to not offer health plans is particularly salient among small, low-wage
employers [55, 56, 57]. 1
While these studies agree that financial incentives would increase the prevalence of employment-
based insurance, field and experimental studies report that the provision of a health plan is not
solely a financial matter. In the late 1980s, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation sponsored a
series of programs in nine cities to subsidize health insurance for small firms that did not offer this
benefit. A mere five percent of the eligible firms decided to enroll, contradicting the prediction
that lowering premium costs would lead to higher provision [59]. A similar voluntary program
was conducted in two cities in New York state [60] and a randomized trial in San Diego [61], both
suggesting that employers who do not offer health insurance are reluctant to do so even when 50
percent of the cost would be subsidized.
The main criticism of these findings is that the temporary nature of these programs was unattrac-
tive to many employers who did not want to offer insurance and then discontinue it when the
subsidies ended. This very criticism points out the social nature of employment-based insur-
ance. Employment-based insurance is not merely a form of compensation but signals a social
commitment between employers and their employees. In addition to the rising cost, the decline
of employment-based insurance may be in part driven by the transformation of the employment
relationship in the United States [62, 63, 64].
This article expands the focus on financial constraints and investigates how workers collective
bargaining power may shape the provision of health benefits and moderate the impact of premium
costs in recent years. Instead of focusing on financial factors, we examine how the provision of
employment-based health benefits is codetermined by both economic and social concerns. In the
next section, we trace the history of health benefits and review existing literature on the links
1In addition to premium cost, there has been an extensive investigation viewing the issue through a financial lens.
Abraham, Feldman, and Graven [58] find that since compensation in the form of insurance premium is either exempt
or taxed at a lower rate, the preferential treatment helps to stimulate the provision of health plans for those earning
higher income or residing in the states with higher tax rates.
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between employment relationship and the provision of health insurance.
3.2 The Changing Landscape of Employment
Health benefits emerged as a form of compensation during the Second World War, after the
Roosevelt administration instituted wage controls to curb potential inflation. This policy faced
strong opposition from trade and labor unions, which had gained a strong foothold in national
politics in the 1930s and threatened to organize a general strike in response. To compromise, the
War Labor Board excluded health benefits from wage controls and the Internal Revenue Service
granted employer-sponsored health benefits exempt status from income tax at federal, state, and
city levels.
The popularity of employment-based health benefits soared as unions expanded. By 1960s,
nearly all employers provided some form of health insurance. There are several reasons why the
provision of health benefits rose alongside the expansion of organized labor even in the absence of
wage control. First, union members tend to be older, more educated, and higher paid, suggesting
that they have greater demand for health care and benefit more from the tax deduction [65]. Second,
unions increase workers bargaining capacities through the expression of collective preferences and
the threat of strike, both ensuring the employer will be sensitive and responsive to workers demand
[66, 67].
Several studies have indicated that unions may play a direct role in supporting employment-
based health benefits. By organizing union hall meetings and training programs, union officers
inform the members about positive health practices and the rights to healthcare [68]. Unions also
provide a channel through which workers voice their concerns about health and related issues,
rather than leaving employment to seek healthcare elsewhere [69, 70]. Furthermore, even though
unionized workers tend to be better off on average, unionization provides the most benefit when
it reaches formerly marginalized workers such as women, minorities, and less-educated workers,
who tend to have less individual bargaining power and therefore gain the most when unionized
[71]. This point becomes particularly salient as de-unionization falls upon marginalized work-
ers first and thus limits the union gains associated with employer sponsored healthcare to more
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advantaged workers.
Importantly, unions may foster long-term commitment between employees and their employ-
ers. Studies have often found that union members tend to have lower turnover rates than non-
unionized workforce when reporting similar or lower levels of job satisfaction [72, 73, 74]. Union-
ized workers also tend to participate more in workplace governance [75], and are more likely to
have high levels of commitment and loyalty to their company during periods of organizational re-
structuring [76, 77]. With long-term commitments from union employees, an investment in the
health of the workforce could be mutually beneficial. Additionally, employers anticipating long
term employment relationships may find it useful to offer healthcare to attract high quality em-
ployees.
Some studies have shown that the presence of labor unions in the local labor market affects
both unionized and non-unionized establishments. To compete for workers and prevent unioniza-
tion in highly unionized states, non-unionized establishments are under pressure to provide similar
compensation [78, 79]. Even when nonunionized establishments do not compete directly with
unionized establishments, labor unions tend to set the social norms regarding employment condi-
tions [80].
While organized labor played an important role in setting the compensation standards in the
post-war era, its influence began to decline in the 1980s and the 1990s as it was challenged and
undermined at multiple fronts. As unions declined and the flexible employment model became
the norm, employment-based insurance, essentially an investment in workers most portable human
capital, began to provide less return to the employers. Health benefits became the privilege of
workers with the most collective bargaining power. Using a survey of employers conducted by
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation in 1993, an early study estimate that declining unionization
could account for 20-35 percent of the decrease in the offering of health plans between 1983 and
1997 [81]. A similar conclusion is reached in a separate study using the Employer Costs for
Employee Compensation survey conducted in 2004 [67].
However, recent studies have casted doubt on whether labor unions still play an important
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role in promoting employment conditions. New evidence suggests that strike activity by unions
is no longer associated with rising wages or distribution of income towards labor [82, 83]. In
addition, scholars have found zero or negative benefits associated with union certification elections
and union bargaining in the United States [84, 85]. Furthermore, as unions declines, they may no
longer be able to shape the employment conditions of non-unionized workplaces. The inability of
unions to expand into new, non-unionized industries or states has stopped premiums from reaching
the wider labor market, despite attempts by unions to diversify and adapt to new conditions. This
pattern has been compounded by political weakness of unions, meaning unions are increasingly
unable to sway elections or mobilize private sector workers who might organize for more generous
labor market policies [71, 86]. In healthcare, the question then becomes whether unions can still
influence general norms about health benefits.
This study advances the study on the provision of health benefits in two main ways. First, we
update previous employer-level studies [67, 81] by testing whether labor unions remain a critical
force in sustaining employment-based health insurance in the 21st century. Second, we integrate
literature focusing on the rising healthcare costs with the literature on changing employment re-
lationships. We hypothesize that, independent of the premium costs, the establishments in which
workers have greater collective bargaining capacity are more likely to provide health plans. Fur-
thermore, we hypothesize that workers collective bargaining power could moderate the adverse
effects of premium costs, meaning that the employers would be less cost sensitive when their
workforce is more organized.
3.3 Study Data and Method
3.3.1 Data
Our primary data source is the restrict-use Medical Expenditures Panel SurveyInsurance Com-
ponent (MEPS-IC) at the Federal Research Data Centers for the years 1999–2012.2 The MEPS-IC
provides information regarding employer sponsored health insurance as well as financial and de-
2In 2008, the MEPS-IC switched from a retrospective to a current-year survey. Therefore, our sample does not
include data for 2007.
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mographic characteristics for a nationally representative sample of private establishments. Specif-
ically, it asks whether the establishment provides any health insurance and, if so, how much the
employer contributes to the premium cost.
We augment theMEPS-IC bymatching the establishments to the Longitudinal Business Database
(LBD) and the Business Registrar (BR) also provided by the Census Bureau. This allows us to gain
additional establishment characteristics, as well as linking individual establishments to their par-
ent firms. To assess the impacts of state-level factors, we also construct variables using the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series [87].
3.3.2 Measures
Our outcome of interest is whether the establishment provides any health plan, including single,
plus-one, or family coverage. We test the importance of workers collective bargaining capacity
at both the establishment and state level. Establishment-level union density is measured as the
percentage of employees that are union members. State-level union density is measured as the
percentage of workers that are union members or covered by union contracts. In addition, we
include a dichotomous variable indicating whether the state has right-to-work legislation.
A main challenge of our analysis is that the potential costs of provision is unobserved among
workplaces that do not provide any health benefits. If unionization reduces the cost of purchasing
health insurance [?], we would see a spurious association between unionization and the provision
of health benefits if the premium cost is unaccounted for in our analysis. We address this challenge
by matching providing and non-providing establishments with the Coarsened Exact Matching tech-
nique (CEM) [88, 89]. Unlike propensity score matching that groups observations with similar
likelihood of receiving treatment, CEM is a nonparametric technique of preprocessing data that
accounts for confounding factors but does not make linear assumptions regarding the underlying
functional forms. We match the establishments with characteristics that would influence insurance
costs, including total number of employees, percentage of female employees, the percentage of
workers 50 years old or older, whether the parent firm has multiple establishments, year, and state.
Based on these criteria, observations are placed into the various cells in which all establishment
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share similar characteristics. After the matching we drop the observations for the bins that do not
have at least one offering establishment and at least one non-offering establishment. This leaves
around 68% of the original sample. We then impute the average health insurance cost per worker
for firms that do not offer any plans using the average cost of health insurance from the matched
establishments that offer health plans
In addition, our regression analysis accounts for a series of characteristics that are associated
with the provision of health benefits. At the firm level, we account for the founding period of the
firm, firm age, whether the firm has a multi-unit operation, non-profit status, as well as employment
size. At the establishment level, we control for the average pay of employees, percentages of
workers that are part-time, female, 50 years old or older, or receive low wages.3 At the state level,
we control for unemployment rates and the percentage of population living under the poverty line
to account for the state-wide demand for labor. Table B.1 presents the summary statistics and
description of the variables used in our analysis.
3.3.3 Analytical Strategy
We estimate the effects of employment relationship and premium cost on the provision of health
insurance with a series of logistic regression models. Our main model is specified as:
Log
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where Y indicates the provision of any health plan. We absorb the effects of time-constant, un-
observed state characteristics with s and industry fixed effects with n. Additionally we absorb
year-specific shocks such as recession with y. Ui;s;y denotes the percentage of workers that are
unionized and Ci;s;y denotes the employers contribution to premium cost per worker for establish-
ment, i, in state, s, for year, y. At the state-level, UNs;y denotes the union density andRs;y indicates
3The MEPS-IC adjusts the definition of low-wage workers across different survey years. In general, employees
who receive at or below the 25th percentile for all hourly wages in the US are classified as low-wage workers. In 1999
the cutoff was set at $6.50 and increased to $11.50 for 2012.
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whether there is right-to-work legislation in state, s, and year, y. Xp includes all the control vari-
ables described above. The coefficients of interest are 1, 2, 3, and 4. We expect establishment
and state-level union density to be positively associated with the provision of health plans, while
premium cost and right-to-work legislation have adverse effects.
To test how employment relationships could moderate the adverse effect of premium cost, we
sequentially add an interaction term between the premium cost and the three variables associated
with employment relationship. We expect establishment- and state-level union densities to re-
duce the adverse effect of premium cost, and the right-to-work legislation to intensify employers
sensitivity to cost. All our estimates below are weighted using sample weights provided by the
MEPS-IC which are adjusted for non-response and post stratification.
3.4 Study Results
Table B.2 presents the coefficients and standard errors from our main models. Model (1) in-
cludes all variables except the cost per worker. It shows that establishments with higher-levels of
unionized workers are more likely to provide health plans. Furthermore, the results indicate that
the decision to provide is embedded in a wider context. The union density at the state level is
positively associated, while right-to-work legislation is negatively associated with the provision of
health plans. These results support our hypothesis that organized labor remains an important force
in sustaining the provision of health plans.
Other coefficients behave in their expected manner. At the establishment level–higher com-
pensation, a greater proportion of female and older workers, and fewer part-time and low-wage
workers are associated with greater likelihoods of providing any health plan. At the firm level,
more established firms, a larger workforce, and non-profit status are all associated with higher
likelihood of providing health benefits. When comparing firms of the same employment size, we
see that firms with multi-unit operation are less likely to provide health insurance, which may be
driven by the fact that workers are more dispersed and therefore have less collective bargaining
power. At the state level, we do not see the demand for labor, measured by both unemployment
and poverty rates, to have a significant impact on the decision of provision, though the coefficients
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are both negative.
In Model (2) we include the cost per worker to provide health plans as a determinant of pro-
vision. As expected, the higher the cost, the less likely the employer will provide the benefit.
Furthermore, the inclusion of premium cost does not attenuate the association between workers
collective bargaining power and health benefits, suggesting that the effects of union and related
legislation are robust even when the potential cost is considered.
Since the actual cost of providing health insurance could be systematically higher for non-
providing establishments than for providing establishments due to unobserved characteristics, we
re-estimate Model (2) two more times with a different assumption for each model. In Model (3)
and (4), we impute the cost for non-providing establishments to be 10 percent or 20 percent higher
than for providing establishments, conditional on observed characteristics. The results suggest that
the impact of employment relationship remains substantial even with alternative cost measures.
To test whether employment relationship moderate the adverse effect of premium cost, we in-
teract premium cost with the three indicators of employment relationship and include them within
the model specified in Table B.2 Model 1. We present these estimates in Table B.3 showing that
both the union densities at the establishment- and the state-level reduce the adverse effect of pre-
mium cost, while the right-to-work legislation intensifies the consequence. While we only have
conclusive evidence indicating that state-level union density significantly reduces the impact of
rising premium (P<0.05), these results suggest that the adverse of premium costs could be exacer-
bated by the deterioration of organized labor.
3.5 Discussion
This article examines how rising premium cost and employment relationship jointly shape the
provision of health insurance in workplaces. We find that, while premium cost is a clear deter-
rent for the offering of health plans, workers collective bargaining power remains an important
determinant for the provision of health benefits in the 21st century. Evidence suggests that both
establishment- and state-level union densities increase the likelihood of employers providing health
plans, while right-to-work legislation depresses the provision. Furthermore, state-level union den-
30
sity reduces the adverse impact of premium costs, which indicates that employment relationship
could either exacerbate or moderate the consequence of rising premium costs.
Much of the current discussion on employer-sponsored health care has been concentrated on the
effect of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on employer offers. New evidence indicates that coverage
has not declined because of the ACA, and that coverage may have modestly risen in advance of the
employer mandate [90]. In the meantime, less attention is paid to how the prevalence of employer-
sponsored insurance may affect the success of the ACA. Nationally, the ACAs exchanges are less
likely to provide sufficient coverage in states where organized labor is weak and right-to-work laws
are instituted ??. This suggests that a more tenuous employment relationship could offload the
burden of health expanse from employers to employees and indirectly undermine the exchanges.
Two policy recommendations could be made to strength labor bargaining power. If unions in
small, low wage workplaces are the carriers of increased healthcare coverage, it will be key to sup-
port legal frameworks which facilitate these campaigns. Sponsorship of the Employee Free Choice
Act, which would enable unions to certify elections with signatures and increase responsibilities
and penalties for not following through on arbitration, would be a powerful step in low-wage work-
places. Next, it will be important to uphold the 2015 Browning-Ferris decision of the National La-
bor Relations Board, recently repealed and then reinstated, which establishes joint-employer status
between contractors, franchises and larger employers. Such a legal framework is crucial in large,
franchised or subcontracted workplaces to enable divided, precarious workers to organize across
work units for healthcare.
3.6 Conclusion
While the rising premium cost has been a main deterrent for employers to offer health plans,
this study indicates that the decision to provide is also embedded in a wider social context. Employ-
ers are more likely to provide health plans when their workers are organized and when the estab-
lishment locates in a more labor-friendly state. Our results suggest that, in addition to the employer
mandate provision, policies that strengthen organized labor could promote the access to health care
and lessen the burden of the ACA and its associated Medicaid expansion. Future research should
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consider organized labor as an important determinant of the provision of employment-based health
insurance.
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4. THE ROLE OF EDUCATORS IN THE REPORTING OF CHILD MALTREATMENT:
CAUSAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
4.1 Introduction
The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services [91] reports that over 3.2 million children
received an investigation or alternative response in suspicion of child maltreatment in 2014 with
702,000 of those children being proven victims of child maltreatment. In the same year they
estimated that 1,580 children died from abuse or neglect.
The long run outcomes for maltreatment victims have been well-documented. Children ex-
posed to abuse have an increased risk for delinquency and criminal involvement as adults as well
as an increased risk for violent behavior [92, 93]. These children are also more likely to suffer from
depression [94, 95], behavioral problems [96], post-traumatic stress disorder [97, 98], and are at an
increased risk for chronic diseases [99, 100]. Currie and Widom [101] report that adults with doc-
umented histories of childhood abuse and/or neglect have lower levels of educational attainment,
earnings, and fewer assets, with more pronounced effects for women. The societal economic bur-
den created by child maltreatment for 2008 was estimated to be as large as $585 billion [102]. With
such a high cost for the victims and society as a whole, efforts to prevent future child maltreatment
are of great importance.
One first step towards combating maltreatment is reporting the incidents whenever they occur.
Unfortunately, it is well documented that reports sent to state CPS agencies grossly underestimate
the actual severity of child maltreatment [103, 104, 105, 106, 107]. It is estimated that official
rates for substantiated child maltreatment represent less than 10% of actual abuse and neglect
[108]. One could surmise that the reason for this large number of unreported incidents is that child
maltreatment can only be reported if the victims are visible to potential reporters. Most abuse
and neglect is committed by parents or caretakers whereas the vast majority of reports stem from
referrals made by individuals outside of the home environment [91]. Throughout the last decade,
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numerous states across the US have signed into law over one hundred legislative acts involving
the reporting of child maltreatment.1 A multitude of occupations have been deemed mandatory
reporters of child maltreatment; social workers, teachers, counselors, law enforcement officers,
and physicians in nearly every state are all required to report to child protective services if they
suspect abuse or neglect [91]. All of these efforts to limit the amount of underreporting do little if
children are not visible to potential reporters. Attending school is one of the biggest ways victims
of child maltreatment can increase their visibility to potential reporters.
The main contribution of this paper empirically measures the magnitude of the effect school at-
tendance has on maltreatment reporting. I estimate the effect by exploiting the seasonal patterns in
school attendance using two methodological approaches. The first approach is a simple difference-
in-differences design leveraging variation in attendance across different age groups. Children be-
low the age of five are less likely to be enrolled in school, therefore, maltreatment reports for this
age group are less likely to be affected by the academic calendar compared to children six or older.
Reports for children below the age of five gives us information on the expected change in reporting
from the school year to the summer months not driven by school attendance. The second approach
is similar to the first except it incorporates enrollment data at the state-age level to better capture the
actual level of school attendance at varyings ages for different states. This is especially important
as there is considerable variation across states in participation in pre-K and Headstart programs
[109].
Another important contribution shows that reports initiated by educators do not simply replace
reports that would have been initiated by other reporting entities. One might expect non-educators
to have a sharp increase in reporting whenever children begin their summer break, potentially
picking up cases that would have been filed by educators, but this does not appear to happen.
This suggests a lack of substitutability in reporting between educators and non-educators. It also
implies that a substantial number of reports made by teachers would otherwise go unreported. This
highlights the importance of states requiring educators to report any incident of suspected child
1Education Commission of the States (ECS) State Policy Database,
https://b5.caspio.com/dp.asp?AppKey=b7f93000695b3d0d5abb4b68bd14&id=a0y70000000CboyAAC
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maltreatment.2 Unfortunately, even with this mandate, some teachers still fail to file reports even
when they suspect abuse might have occurred [110]. A back of the envelope calculation suggests
that over 28,000 reports of substantiated abuse go unreported each year when school-aged children
are on summer break.
With such a large number of unreported cases of child maltreatment it is clear that maltreat-
ment reports do not accurately reflect the true level of actual maltreatment. For my identification to
be valid actual maltreatment cannot drive the downward trend in summer reporting. If it were the
case that actual maltreatment falls during the summer months then it would mechanically follow
that reporting would drop as well. Using proxy data for actual child maltreatment in the form of
inpatient hospitalization records and mortality data, I find no evidence that actual maltreatment
falls during the summer months. A secondary threat to identification comes from educators po-
tentially over-reporting less severe or marginal cases of maltreatment that would have not been
deemed serious enough to be reported by other entities. This is not the cases as the effect of school
attendance on maltreatment reporting still remains even after restricting the sample to more severe
cases of abuse an neglect.
The rest of this paper will go as follows: Section 4.2 will give a description of the maltreatment
and enrollment data. Section 4.3 will describe the methodologies used in this paper. Section 4.4
will go over the results. Section 4.5 will address identification concerns. Section 4.6 will discuss
policy implications and conclude.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Data on Maltreatment
Data for child maltreatment reporting comes from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data
System (NCANDS) Child File, a federally sponsored effort that annually collects maltreatment
data from state CPS agencies.3 The data represents a census of child maltreatment reports known
to CPS agencies from nearly every state across the nation for the years 2002 to 2015. The data
2https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/manda/
3This data is provided by the National Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect from the College of Human
Ecology at Cornell University[111].
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includes general information about each incident, including the date the report was filed, what
reporting entity initially referred the incident to CPS, and the state where the report was filed. Due
to the sensitive nature of the data all reporting dates are suppressed to two reporting dates per
month. Any incident that occurred between the 1st and 15th get recorded as an “8” and any incident
that occurred after the 15th was recorded as a “23”. This gives a total of 24 distinct reporting
periods, or dates, throughout each year.
Each report also lists the reporting entity that initiated the referral of alleged maltreatment to a
CPS agency. The different reporting entities are listed in Table C.1 along with the portion of total
maltreatment reports each entity is responsible for at various ages. Educational personnel show the
largest change in the proportion of total reports as the age group increases. The proportion doubles
in size from 9.17% at age 3 to 19.02% at age 5 with a plateau of around 24% from age 7 to 12. No
other reporting entity has such drastic change in their relative proportion of total reports. For this
paper, “reports from non-educators” will consist of all reporting sources other than reports filed
by education personnel. Unknown or missing reporting sources were dropped from the analysis.
Results were not sensitive to this omission.
The data is structured in a way that each observation consists of a unique child-report pairing.
A benefit of this unique pairing is that it eliminates the concern for potential double counting of
maltreatment reports. For example, if an educator and another entity initiate maltreatment reports
for the same incident then an increase in the number of reports during the school year does not
necessarily reflect an increase in the number of children being reported. A limitation of the data
however is that multiple children can be included on the same report even though the initial referral
was for a single child. This implies that it is not clear if the reporting entity actually referred a case
of potential maltreatment for a certain child included in a report with multiple children. Many
states conduct investigations for all children within a family whenever any child is the subject of
an investigation [91]. I will refer to the uncertain inclusion of siblings on a maltreatment report as
the “sibling effect.” I restrict a portion of the analysis to reports involving only one child to address
this issue.
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I aggregate the child-report pairings by age, reporting date, and year for my first analysis that
relies on the variation in reporting across child age groups. For my analysis using variation across
states, I re-aggregate the data to the age, state, reporting date, and year level.The aggregated counts
are then divided by the relevant number of reporting days for each of the 24 reporting periods
throughout each year to eliminate any mechanical fluctuations. Any reports that were unsubstanti-
ated due to being intentionally false were dropped from the sample. Reporting rates are calculated
using yearly population data provided by the National Cancer Institutes’s Surveillance Epidemiol-
ogy and End Results (Cancer-SEER) program.
4.2.2 Data on School Enrollment
School enrollment data are based on the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates
collected annually by the U.S. Census Bureau.4 The data consists of the enrollment percentage of
each age group within each state for each year from 2002-2015. Table C.2 reports that nearly a
third of all three-year-olds across the U.S. are enrolled in some form of schooling. This percentage
rises with each successive age group. Almost all children are enrolled in school by the age of six.
Since the data measures whether or not a child attended school within a certain year it cannot be
used to determine when children are actually attending school.
It is important to note that the definition of enrollment within the survey also includes nursery
or preschool. For children ages 3 or 4 it could very well be the case that they are enrolled in nursery
or preschool that remains open throughout the year and thus would not have a summer break. This
is troublesome in that I am making the assumption that all children enrolled in school will have
the same academic calendar. However, I would expect this issue to only bias the estimates towards
zero. The enrollment data contributes towards measuring the drop in aggregate school attendance
across age groups during the summer. If there is no drop in attendance for 3 or 4-year-olds during
the summer, then the level of enrollment should have no significant effect when considering the
changes in maltreatment reporting that occurs from the school year to the summer months.
4Data is provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA).
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4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Defining the Academic Calendar
I define the months from September to May as the academic year. This is a rough measure for
the academic calendar, as many schools might still hold some classes during the summer months
and all schools have multiple breaks within the school year. A more comprehensive academic
calendar could take into account Thanksgiving, spring, and winter breaks as well as include a more
precise cutoff for the summer break for each school district across the United States. Unfortunately
it is not feasible for me to construct such as measure. During the months of June, August, and the
second half of December schools are likely to be transitioning to or from break at different times.
This leaves ambiguity as to what percent of children are actually attending school during these
dates. This is not a major concern as it would only serve to bias the estimates downwards. A
separate analysis dropping the troublesome dates showed an increase in the estimated effect.
4.3.2 Estimations Based on Variation in Child Age
This first methodology relies on variation driven by differences in seasonal reporting across
different child age groups. For this estimation strategy maltreatment reports are aggregated for
each age, reporting date, and year. The estimation model for this methodology is:
ln(CMawy) = a + Sm + Ta  Sm + awy; (4.1)
where CMawy are rates of maltreatment reports for children of age a in half month w for year
y; a are age fixed effects; Sm is an indicator for the school year months of September to May; and
Ta is an indicator if the child is of “schooling age,” defined as either five or six.5 The random error
term, awy, is allowed to be correlated across time within an age group and across all ages in any
given year by estimating two-way standard errors following Cameron et al. [112]. This difference-
in-differences model measures the increase in maltreatment reporting during the school year for
children reaching “schooling age" compared to children not of “schooling age.” The identifying
5Poisson models yield very similar estimates.
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assumption is that younger children not of “schooling age" provide a comparison for how reports
would have changed from the school-year to the summer months not driven by school attendance.
4.3.3 Estimations Based on Variation by State Using School Enrollment Data
Adding school enrollment data into the model described above incorporates and intensity level
of actual school attendance at varying ages across different states. Maltreatment reports for this
estimation are aggregated at the each age, state, reporting date, and year level. The following
estimation model is implemented:
ln(CMaswy) = s + Sm + Enrollas  Sm + aswy; (4.2)
where CMaswy are rates of maltreatment reports for children of age a in state s in half month
w for year y; s are state fixed effects; Sm is an indicator for the school year months of September
to May; and Enrollas is the enrollment percentage for children of age a in state s averaged across
all years.6 The random error term, aswy, is allowed to be correlated across time within a state and
across all states in any given year by estimating two-way standard errors following Cameron et al.
[112]. The identifying assumption underlying this model is that states with a higher school starting
age (or lower enrollment for younger ages) offer as a comparison group for kids of the same age
in other states with a lower school starting age (or higher enrollment for younger ages) telling us
how reports would change from the school-year to summer not driven by school attendance.
4.4 Analysis
4.4.1 Maltreatment Reports from Educators
Looking at the reports initiated by educators, Figure C.1 displays the average reporting rates
for each of the 24 reporting dates for different child ages for the years 2002-2015. The drop in
reports during the summer months is apparent for any age group with the smallest drop occurring
6I add 0.0625 (the smallest reported unit) to all child maltreatment report counts before constructing log rates to
avoid dropping observations for which the outcome would otherwise be undefined. This amount comes about from
the bimonthly reporting nature of the data. The largest reporting period is 16 days so 1 report in 16 days corresponds
to 1/16 or 0.0625 reports per day. Poisson models yield very similar estimates.
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for children 2 and under and then increasing in relative magnitude with each older age group. The
most drastic increase occurs from ages 4 to 5 with an additional large increase occurring from ages
5 to 6. This is expected since these age groups have the largest increases in school enrollment as
reported in Table C.2. The increase in school enrollment from age 4 and age 5 is 25.5% and 12.8%
from ages 5 to 6. After age six, enrollment remains constant with nearly all children enrolled in
some form of schooling.
There is some seasonality in reports initiated by educators for the age group two and under. It is
not expected for children at these ages to be enrolled in any sort of program that uses a traditional
academic calendar. This is a visual representation of the previously mention “sibling effect” which
will be addressed later on in Section 4.4.3.1.
A vast majority of states have their cutoff age for starting kindergarten to be 5 on or before a
specified date in the fall.7 Thus, a 5-year-old listed on a maltreatment report filed in September
is more likely to have been enrolled in school than a 5-year-old on a maltreatment report that was
filed in May. This scenario can be seen in the maltreatment data when differencing the reporting
rates between certain age groups. Figure C.2 displays the difference in the reporting rates between
children ages 6 and 5 as well as the difference in the reporting rates between children ages 7 and 6
as a comparison. Starting from September, the difference in reports between children aged 6 and
aged 5 is almost zero. This difference increases as we move through the year peaking in May at
0.014 reports per 1,000 children before reducing back to zero during the summer months. There
is no significant difference in reporting rates by educators across months between children aged 7
and aged 6 as nearly all children of age six are enrolled in school regardless of their birth month.
Looking at reports from non-educators in Figure C.3, reporting rates remain fairly consistent
throughout the year for each age group. Reports for children under the age of 2 have the highest
reporting rates with each successive age group decreasing in the rate of reports with six-year-olds
having the lowest rates shown in the figure. For all age groups the reporting patterns throughout the
year remain the same. There no strong changes during the summer months and, more importantly,
7National Center for Education Statistics, State Education Reforms
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_3.asp
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no visible differences in reporting between age groups four, five, and six. If reports initiated by ed-
ucators substituted for reports initiated by non-educators then there should be an uptick during the
summer months for children of schooling-age. There could be heterogeneity among the different
entities that comprise of the non-educator group but any effects do not show in the aggregate.
With the relative homogeneity across ages for reports initiated by non-educators and the het-
erogeneity in reports from educators, it is of no surprise that reports for school-age children drop
dramatically during the summer months. Figure C.4 displays the total reporting rates for children
ages three to four and the total reporting rates for children ages five to twelve. Children below the
traditional schooling-age have lower levels of school enrollment offering a comparison as to how
reports would change from the school year to the summer months not driven by school attendance.
There is a small drop in reporting for children ages three to four but it pales in comparison to the
drop experienced for the age group five to twelve. Using the methodology described in Section
4.3.2, I estimate the effect of school attendance on maltreatment reporting within this difference-
in-differences framework in the following section.
4.4.2 Regression Results for Variation by Child Age
The results for estimating Equation 4.1 are reported in Table C.3 where each row and column
are one regression. The first panel defines the cutoff age for starting school at age five and the
second panel defines it at age six. Starting with column (1) the estimates indicate that attending
school increases total maltreatment reports by 17.0% during the school year when defining the
school starting age at five and lessens to 15.0% when changing the age cutoff from five to six.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table C.3 add month and year fixed effects and then month-year interacted
fixed effects, respectively. The estimates remain constant with the inclusion of these fixed effects
showing that the estimated effects for both age cutoffs are not sensitive to monthly fluctuations
in reporting or long term changes throughout the reporting period. The remaining columns (4)
through (8) vary the sample size by different age groups to show which age groups are mainly
responsible for driving the results. Restricting the sample to children ages four to six, the estimated
effect of school attendance on maltreatment reports is a 10.0% increase when defining the starting
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age at five, 9.0% for age six. Adding successive age groups to the sample, moving from columns
(5) to (7), serve to bolster the magnitude of the effect. This shows that maltreatment reports for
the additional age (treatment) groups are more affected by the school year than those ages closure
to, but above, the age cutoff. Finally, when restricting the age group to children ages three to
six in column (8), the estimated effect of school attendance on maltreatment reporting is a 12.2%
increase when defining the starting age at five, and 11.7% at age six. The magnitude of the effect
is larger when comparing it to column (4) showing that maltreatment reports from children of age
three are less likely to be affected by school year that those ages closure to, but below, the age
cutoff.
When estimating the effect school attendance has on maltreatment reports, the estimates in
Table C.3 should be considered conservative for three main reasons. First, school enrollment is
defined by age. This strict definition assumes that all children above a certain age (five or six) are
enrolled in school. When looking at Table C.2, no age group has complete enrollment, or non-
enrollment, in school. The second methodology using state level variation described in Section
4.3.3 will better account for the differences in enrollment at varying ages across different states.
Results for this analysis are located in Section 4.4.3.
The second reason why these estimates should be considered conservative is the issue of the
previously mentioned “sibling effect.” Since many states include all children within a family on a
maltreatment report whenever any child becomes part of an investigation, it is not clear which child
was initially referred to CPS. Thus, there could be numerous incidents in which a child under the
typical schooling age is included on a report that was initiated by an educator for suspected abuse
or neglect of an older sibling. A simply way to eliminate this issue is by restricting the analysis to
only include single child reports. This analysis is located in Section 4.4.3.1.
Lastly, the school year is defined as the months of September through May. This rough defini-
tion for the academic calendar does not take into account the numerous breaks that occur through-
out the school year. It also does not take into account the different beginnings and endings of
the summer break across schools. In Section 4.4.3.2 I rerun the analysis dropping observations
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from the months of June, August, and the second half of December to address this measurement
error and better capture whenever children are actually attending school. Dropping these dates of
more questionable school attendance better segments the treatment period, the school year, from
the control period, summer break.
4.4.3 Regression Results for Variation by School Enrollment
Variation in school enrollment across states mostly occurs for children aged three to five. Figure
C.5 plots the density of enrollment for children ages 3 to 6 using state-year observations. There
is considerable variation in school enrollment across states for ages 3, 4, and 5 with nearly all
children enrolled in school at age 6. In Figure C.6 states are separated into enrollment quartiles for
all children ages 3 to 5. The estimates are then demeaned to better show seasonality in reporting
throughout the year. States in the highest quartile of enrollment show the largest relative drop
in reporting during the summer months with mixed results for the lowest and middle quartiles.
This provides evidence that even the younger age groups, not necessarily of typical schooling age,
benefit from an increase in enrollment through greater maltreatment reporting.
Estimates exploiting variation in school enrollment using Equation 4.2 are reported in Table C.4
where each column is one regression. I first restrict the sample to children ages three to six. School
enrollment increases the most for this age range and also has the greatest variation in enrollment
across states. Starting with column (1), I start with age fixed effects as well as month interacted
with year fixed effects so results would be comparable to column (8) in Table C.3. The interaction
term between summer and reported school enrollment suggests, with complete enrollment, school
attendance increases reports by 28.3%. This is over twice the magnitudes reported in column (8)
in Table C.3 showing the importance of a more accurately defined school attendance variable. In
column (2), with the inclusion of state fixed effects the estimate drops in magnitude to 25.2%. State
fixed effects control for the relative differences in the reporting rates across states. The interaction
term between the school year and enrollment no longer needs to explain the aggregate differences
across states and instead focuses on the relative differences between states. Column (3) reports
an increase back to 28.3% after the inclusion of state interacted with age fixed effects. These
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fixed effects account for the variation in the potential differences in reporting practices across age
groups within each state. Further interacting age and year fixed effects, controlling for national-
level changes in reporting patterns that might target specific age groups, does little to change the
estimates as shown in column (4).8
Dropping three-year-olds from the sample in column (5) further increases the estimated effect
of school attendance on maltreatment reporting to 34.6%, assuming complete enrollment. This
suggests that a proportion of three-year-olds might be enrolled in some form of year-round school-
ing. If there is no change in attendance from the school year to the summer months then the
interaction term defining school attendance should have no estimated effect. Thus, including them
in the sample would serve to bias the estimates toward zero.
Adding additional older ages to the sample, reported in columns (6) to (8), serve to increase
the magnitude of the estimated effect. This increase is expected because the proportion of the
reports from educational personnel are larger for the older age groups as reported in Table C.1.
Lastly, I include the full sample in column (9) which is my preferred specification. Previously, the
estimated effect of attending school reported in Table C.3 was a 17.0% increase in maltreatment
reports. Now using a more precise definition of school attendance this effect increases to 36.9%.
4.4.3.1 “Sibling Effects"
Maltreatment reports initiated by educators are not only important for the children attending
school, they are also important for their siblings. Siblings of maltreated children are also at high-
risk to suffer from maltreatment as well [113]. For this reason many states conduct investigations
for all children within a family whenever any child is the subject of an investigation [91]. This
gives younger siblings that are victims of child maltreatment a better chance of receiving help
whenever their oldest sibling starts attending school.
The NCANDS data does not directly describe the relationships between children for reports
that include more than one child. The data does however include child-perpetrator relationship
8Further including state interacted with year fixed effects to account for state policy changes in maltreatment
reporting did little to nothing in changing the magnitude or precision of the estimates.
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variables for substantiated or indicated cases of maltreatment.9 If a report were to have at least two
children with substantiated or indicated dispositions and non-missing child-perpetrator relationship
variables, it is possible to make child to child relationship pairings within reports. For substantiated
or indicated reports filed by educators that contained multiple children, 38.8% of these reports
contain a child age four or under. Of the 38.8% of reports, 94.5% also include a child of five years
or older. Lastly, of those 94.5% of reports, 79.7% of the younger (age four or under) children were
matched with an older (five or older) sibling and 82.7% were matched with an older relative.10
The inclusion of all children within a family on a maltreatment report explains the considerable
seasonality for children ages two and under shown in Figure C.1. Figure C.7 limits the focus to
reports with only one child, around 30% of the original sample. The seasonality for children two
and under goes completely away along with a comparatively large drop for children ages three
and four. Since it is not possible to determine the relevant population for single child reports, the
reporting rates for all ages drops significantly as the sample size is greatly reduced with the popu-
lation denominator remaining unchanged. Figure C.8 and Figure C.9 represent the same graphs as
Figure C.3 and Figure C.4, respectively, except the data is limited to reports with only one child.
Comparing Figures C.3 and C.8, there is no discernible difference in yearly reporting patterns be-
tween the full sample and single-child report sample for reports initiated by non-educators. There
is, however, a sizable difference between Figures C.4 and C.9 in the relative drop during the sum-
mer, meaning that the elimination of the “sibling effect” from the analysis should bring forth a
greater estimated effect as shown in these two figures.
If we were to assume that the children on single-child maltreatment reports are no different in
their school enrollment practices than those on reports with multiple children, then rerunning the
analysis using only single-child reports should yield a more accurate estimate of the true effect of
school attendance on maltreatment reporting. Implementing the same estimation strategy used in
9Some states include an a additional disposition of “indicated” meaning there is sufficient reason to believe the child
was maltreatment or is at risk, but the case does not meet the level of evidence required for substantiation by state law.
NCANDS considers children receiving a disposition of substantiated or indicated to be a victim of maltreatment [91].
10Due to the nature of the data, it is not possible to determine which child was referred to CPS first that initially
started the investigation. It is possible that a child below the age of five was referred by an educator and the older
sibling was included in the investigation, however, the reverse of the story seems more probable.
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Table C.4, Table C.5 reports the estimated effect of school attendance on maltreatment reporting
using only single child reports. For every estimated effect outside of columns (1), the magnitude
increases by 80 to 90% with this alternative sample. Initially the effect of school attendance on
maltreatment reporting, assuming complete enrollment, was estimated as 36.9% in column (9) of
Table C.4. When only using reports involving only one child, thus eliminating the measurement
error caused by the “sibling effect,” the effect increases to 65.5%.
4.4.3.2 Adjusting the Academic Calendar
The school year in this paper is defined in a very strict manner. It does not account for the
various beginnings and endings of summer break for schools across the US. One way to help
reduce the measurement error induced from this crude measure of the school year is to restrict
attention to observations more certain that children are either on break or in school. It is in this
spirit that I rerun the main analysis omitting the observations from June, August, and the second
half of December. At these dates many schools across and within states are transitioning to or from
a break in schooling. Dropping these observations from the analysis better segments when children
are attending school and when they are not. Table C.6 displays the results from the initial analysis
dropping the observations of questionable school attendance. In all instances the magnitude of the
estimated effect increased in magnitude. If it were possible to include the actual level of school
attendance throughout the year within the model, we would suspect that these estimates would
increase further.
4.4.4 Non Crowd-Out in Reporting
If it were the case that different child maltreatment reporting entities could fill in or fully sub-
stitute for each other in their reporting, then the large drop in reports from educators during the
summer months would not be as problematic. However, a cursory glance at Figures C.3 and C.8
shows this not to be the case. There is no noticeable difference in reporting patterns during the
summer months from non-educators between age groups. If reports initiated by educators replaced
the reports that would have been filed by non-educators then we should see a spike in reporting
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during the summer months for school-age children from non-educators. Since this does not hap-
pen it gives strong descriptive evidence that reports filed by educators do not fully crowd-out the
reports from other entities. This implies the role educators play in the reporting of maltreatment
is extremely important in that if they do not report a potential incident of maltreatment, there is a
good chance no one else will.
Previous to this section all estimations measured the effect of school attendance on total mal-
treatment reports. Using the same estimation strategy implemented in Table C.4, Table C.7 bifur-
cates maltreatment reports into those initiated by educators and those initiated by non-educators.
From the table it is clear that the bulk of the increase in reports during the school is driven by
educators as expected. Incorporating all the different fixed effects, column (4) reports that school
attendance, assuming complete enrollment, increases maltreatment reports initiated by educators
by 86.0% for the sample with the greatest variation in school enrollment. This effect increases
to 88.9% for the full sample in column (9). These large increases in reporting are not surprising
as we would expect reports initiated by educators to have the largest effect. What is surprising is
the limited response from non-educators. The same columns report an estimated effect of 1.8%
(statistically insignificant) and 6.7%, respectively. It is also surprising that these estimates are both
positive. If reports initiated by educators crowded out the reporting from other entities then this
estimate should be negative.
4.4.5 Adjusting for Measurement Error
As previously mentioned, Table C.3 suffers from measurement error in three main ways: 1.
the way enrollment is defined 2. “sibling effect”, and 3. the defined school year. Table C.8
reports the effect of school attendance on maltreatment reporting correcting for the various mea-
surement error issues. Columns (1)–(4) use the specification listed in column (3) from Table C.3,
and columns (5)–(8) use the specification listed in column (10) from Table C.4. Correcting for any
of the measurement errors drastically increase the magnitude of the estimated effect. My preferred
specification from this table is column (6) which uses school enrollment data and corrects for the
sibling effect.
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4.5 Threats to Identification
To assess the validity of the statement that school attendance increases maltreatment reporting,
two main concerns need to be addressed. First, it needs to be shown that the actual rates of child
maltreatment do not fall during the summer months. Second, it could be that teachers are over-
reporting minor/marginal cases of maltreatment that other reporting entities might not consider
severe enough to intervene.
4.5.1 Concern 1: Actual Maltreatment Might Fall When Children Are Out of School
A rhetorical argument can be made that the rate of maltreatment might actually increase. Psy-
chologists have shown that an increase in temperature directly leads to an increase in aggression
and violent crimes [114]. As the ambient temperature increases during the summer months it
could be expected that perpetrators become more likely to commit some form of abuse. Addition-
ally, [115] posit that a potential mechanism for child maltreatment could be attributed to changes
in the time spent at home. Parents are listed as the perpetrator of maltreatment in 78% of substan-
tiated reports in 2014 [91]; thus it is not unreasonable to assume that maltreatment would increase
with a greater amount of time being spent at home with a potential perpetrator during the summer
break from school. Both the increasing temperature and increasing time usage during the summer
months could contribute to an overall increase in maltreatment.
If it is the case that maltreatment truly falls during the summer months we would expect to see
drops in cases from the reporting sectors that are less affected by the academic calendar. Looking
at Figures C.3 and C.8 there is no visible evidence to suggest that there is a decrease in reports
from non-educators. It is actually the case that non-educators have the highest rates of reporting
during the summer months, but for the most part the reporting rate remains relatively constant
throughout the year. There could be both a drop in maltreatment during the summer and an increase
in reporting from non-educators during the same time, although this scenario seems unlikely.
Lastly, data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Kids’ Inpatient Database
(KID) and the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Multiple Cause of Death Mortality
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Data provide a proxy for more serious cases of actual child maltreatment throughout the year. A
benefit of these data is that they are less likely to suffer from seasonal underreporting issues that
exist within the maltreatment reporting data.
The HCUP KIDs file represents the largest publicly-available all-payer pediatric inpatient care
database in the U.S., covering around a weighted estimated 7 million hospitalizations each year.
The KID is collected every three years and for this paper I use the years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009
and 2012. Each hospitalization reports multiple diagnoses based on the International Classification
of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM). Also included in the reports are
multiple ICD-9-CM external cause of injury codes (E codes). Using both the diagnoses codes and
E codes I created variables counting total cases of various types of child maltreatment for each
month throughout the data collection years.11
Figure C.10 displays the weighted total of monthly inpatient reports of child maltreatment for
children ages three to twelve averaged across all reporting years. The figure includes the top three
types of maltreatment–physical abuse, neglect, and sexual abuse–as well as all inpatient reports
that had a diagnosis or external cause of injury from any form of child maltreatment. For the
most part throughout the year maltreatment in any form remains fairly constant. There is a drop in
inpatient reports for all cases during the month of July, but this drop is immediately followed by a
large increase in August.12
The second proxy for actual child maltreatment comes from the NCHS mortality data. I create
two categories of mortality–homicides and maltreatment. These categories were identified using
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD).13 Figure C.11 displays these two categories
in terms of total counts for children ages three to twelve in each month averaged across the years
2002-2015. Homicide counts are located on top with the sub-category of child maltreatment related
11ICD-9-CM codes used for maltreatment consist of: 9955, 99550, 99551, 99552, 99553, 99554, 99555, and 99559.
E codes used for maltreatment consist of: E967, E9670, E9671, E9672, E9673, E9674, E9675, E9676, E9677, E9678,
and E9679.
12In a similar study using the same data, [116] estimated maltreatment for each season for those aged 21 or under.
They document very marginal changes throughout the year with the largest differences being between the Spring
months (25.8% of yearly cases) and Summer (24.7%).
13Using the ICD-10 358 recodes of selected causes of death the following group codes were used for homicides:
43200-44100 and maltreatment: 44000
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homicides on bottom. Maltreatment related homicides are identified as those caused by neglect and
abandonment or other forms of maltreatment such as mental cruelty, physical abuse, sexual abuse
(excluding sexual assault by bodily force), and torture. In either case, whether it be homicides or
the sub-category of child maltreatment related homicides, neither show any indication of a drop in
counts during the summer months of June through August.14
4.5.2 Concern 2: Over-reporting of Maltreatment by Educators
A second concern stems from the potential for educators to over-report minor or marginal cases
of child maltreatment. If educators are being over cautious in reporting what they perceive to be
maltreatment bu which is not actual maltreatment, then the increase in reports during the school
year would be unlikely to help actual victims of abuse and neglect.
In order to address this issue I reestimate Table C.4 limiting the outcome variables to reports
with a higher degree of severity. Table C.9 reports the effect of school attendance on substantiated
maltreatment reports, reports that lead to the removal of the child from the home, and reports that
lead to a child placed into foster care. For all three outcomes the effect is similar to that of the full
sample, however, the magnitude is somewhat smaller. Using the preferred specification, column
(10), the effect of the school year on all reports was estimated at 36.9%, when limiting the analysis
to only substantiated reports this effect decreases to 29.5%. Even further, when looking at arguably
even more serious cases, reports that lead to the child being put into a foster care home and reports
that resulted in a child being removed from the home, the estimated effect decreases to 21.6% and
21.8%, respectively.15 The decrease in magnitude could potentially provide evidence of a general
trend in over-cautiousness in maltreatment reporting coming from educators. However, with the
general positive trend in more severe cases being consistent with the estimates reported in Table
C.4, over reporting by educators is not of any concern when considering the validity of the main
estimates.
14Laskey et al. [117] neglect to find a drop in child homicides during the summer months and go even further to say
that there does not appear to be any seasonality in child homicides throughout the year.
15Reports that were substantiated account for 18.1% of all reports, foster care placement 5.7%, and removal from
the home 5.9%.
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
A big reason for the large number of unreported maltreatment incidents is that victims are
not visible to the potential reporters. School attendance offers children their first big boost in
public visibility as educators–many trained to spot indicators of maltreatment–begin to interact
with children on a daily basis. Once children reach schooling age we see a large increase in
maltreatment reporting driven by reports initiated by educators, picking up incidents that would
have likely gone unreported. This effect is one that should not be surprising, as any increase in the
monitoring of child abuse and neglect victims should being about more reports. What is potentially
surprising is that reports from educators are not crowding out the reports filed by other reporting
entities. This suggests a lack of over-lap in the monitoring of children from the various reporting
entities. This makes it all the more important for educators to identify incidents and report them
whenever possible as they might be the only entity with the possibility to do so. Even more so if
the child has younger siblings below schooling age that are also likely to suffer from maltreatment
as well.
The increase in reports during the school year shed light on the large number of maltreatment
incidents that do not get reported during the summer months. In this case we should consider
underreporting as a drop in reports that would have been known to CPS agencies had the children
been in school. A back of the envelope calculation using the estimated effect of school attendance
on substantiated reports listed in column (10) from Table C.9 estimates that 28,061 substantiated
cases of abuse go unreported during the summer months when children are on break from school.16
This calculation is contingent upon actual incidents of maltreatment remaining constant throughout
the year. Evidence to suggest otherwise does not appear to be prevalent.
The large amount of underreporting during the summer months for school age children could
illicit policy measures to extend the academic calendar. Economically speaking this would not
seem to be a very efficient measure. A more reasonable approach to decrease underreporting can be
16The average number of substantiated reports per day per 100,000 children aged 3-12 is 2.59 reports. With a sample
of 39,933,665 children and 92 reporting days during the months of June, July, and August this leads to around 95,123
total substantiated reports for all children aged 3-12 during the summer. Thus we have 95,123*29.5%=28,061.
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applied to younger children through the increasing in enrollment for early childhood development
programs like pre-K and Headstart. These programs have already shown to have beneficial impacts
for children under the age of five [118]. Adding the increase in maltreatment reporting would
only serve to benefit these age groups. Any measures to increase the visibility and monitoring of
children vulnerable to maltreatment should only serve to increase reporting and increase the likely
of maltreated children receiving the help and services they need.
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5. CONCLUSION
With all great studies in economics, an importance needs to be placed on the usability of the
information presented. What good is well-rounded paper if it is purely academic? A great study
not only needs to be empirically sound but actionable as well.
From my work on substance abuse treatment in Chapter 2, it is clear that we as a society are not
taking advantage of the large benefits we could receive when intervening in the illegal drug industry
from the demand side of the market. The societal benefits of building a new treatment facility far
outweigh its costs. This should encourage any community leader to consider increasing their
efforts into substance abuse treatment, not only for the individuals that suffer from the addiction
but also for the numerous residents living within their area. Drug addiction and abuse do not just
affect the user, they affect the community as a whole.
The dynamic of the employer/employee relationship has changed throughout the past century.
With the decline in collective bargaining control of the labor market has shifted favoring the em-
ployer. Additionally, coupled with rising health care costs, this shift in control has led to the
decline in the offering of employer-sponsored health insurance. Understanding the major determi-
nants relating to individual health care options is critical when deciding national-level health care
policies.
Lastly, child maltreatment is an abhorrent part of our society. We must do all we can to limit the
scope and frequency of incidents and the first step in alleviating this problem stems from reporting
all possible incidents whenever they occur. The problem is that maltreatment children can only
receive and intervention if they are visible to potential reporters. This is clear and evident when
seeing the massive increase in reports that occurs whenever children begin to attend school. If a
community wants to increase their efforts in finding and reporting incidents of maltreatment they
will need to implement measures that increase the visibility of children to potential reporters.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX: SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT CENTERS AND LOCAL CRIME
A.1 Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev
Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities (2,453 counties)
Total 49.6 90.1
Net Openings 5.8 10.1
Net Closings 3.7 4.4
Facilities per 100,000 5.0 3.6
NCHS Mortality Files (2,453 counties)
Homicides per 100,000 5.8 5.1
UCR Offenses Known Database (2,184 counties, 9,602 agencies)
Homicides per 100,000 5.7 8.5
Sexual Assaults per 100,000 32.0 26.8
Aggravated Assaults per 100,000 309.2 288.0
Robbery per 100,000 164.8 180.0
Simple Assaults per 100,000 1118.2 878.7
Burglary per 100,000 762.1 523.2
Larceny per 100,000 2551.8 1479.1
Motor Vehicle Theft per 100,000 424.9 458.7
Notes: These data span 1999-2012. The means and standard deviations for the substance-abuse treatment facilities are derived from the NCHS
Mortality sample. The reported facility statistics are similar when using the UCR Known Offenses sample. The means and standard deviations from
the NCHS Restricted Mortality Files represent rates per 100,000 residents in each county and are weighted by county population. The means and
standard deviations for the UCR Offenses Known Database rates per 100,000 residents covered by the municipal law enforcement agency and are
weighted by agency population coverage.
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Table A.2: Estimated Effects of SAT Facilities on Log Homicide Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Homicide Data: NCHS Restricted Mortality Files
Facilities Last Year -0.0022*** -0.0028*** -0.0025*** -0.0025*** -0.0025***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Homicide Data: UCR Offenses Known Database
Facilities Last Year -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
County/Agency and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Officer Rate per 1,000 No No No No Yes
Notes: Estimates are based on 34,326 county-year observations for the NCHS Restricted Mortality Files and 106,965 agency-year observations for
the UCR Offenses Known Database. Demographic control variables include the fraction of the population that are: white, black, male, ages 0–9,
ages 10–19, ages 20–29, ages 30–39, ages 40–49, ages 50–59, and ages 60–69. Controls for economic conditions include the county unemployment
rate and number of firm births. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The regressions
are weighted by county population when using the NCHS Mortality data and are weighted by agency population coverage when using the UCR
Offenses Known data.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.3: Estimated Effects of SAT Facilities on Log Violent Crime Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Homicides
Facilities Last Year -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0016***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Sexual Assaults
Facilities Last Year -0.0010** -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Aggravated Assaults
Facilities Last Year -0.0034*** -0.0021*** -0.0011* -0.0012* -0.0012*
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Simple Assaults
Facilities Last Year -0.0007 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Agency and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Officer Rate per 1,000 No No No No Yes
Notes: Estimates are based on 106,965 agency-year observations. Demographic control variables include the fraction of the population that are:
white, black, male, ages 0–9, ages 10–19, ages 20–29, ages 30–39, ages 40–49, ages 50–59, and ages 60–69. Controls for economic conditions
include the county unemployment rate and number of firm births. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown
in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by agency population coverage.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.4: Estimated Effects of SAT Facilities on Log Financially-Motivated Crime Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Robbery Total
Facilities Last Year -0.0016*** -0.0019*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Motor Vehicle Theft
Facilities Last Year -0.0005 -0.0019*** -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0012**
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Burglary Total
Facilities Last Year -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005*
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Larceny Theft
Facilities Last Year -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Agency and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No Yes Yes
Officer Rate per 1,000 No No No No Yes
Notes: Estimates are based on 106,965 agency-year observations. Demographic control variables include the fraction of the population that are:
white, black, male, ages 0–9, ages 10–19, ages 20–29, ages 30–39, ages 40–49, ages 50–59, and ages 60–69. Controls for economic conditions
include the county unemployment rate and number of firm births. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown
in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by agency population coverage.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.5: Expanding Model To Additionally Consider Contemporaneous and Future Facility Counts
Motor
Homicide Homicide Sexual Aggravated Simple Vehicle Larceny
(NCHS Data) (UCR Data) Assault Assault Assault Robbery Theft Burglary Theft
Facilities Last Year -0.0010* -0.0016*** -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0007** -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0019)
Facilities This Year -0.0014* -0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0022)
Facilities Next Year -0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0009
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0010)
Notes: Estimates are based on 34,326 county-year observations for the NCHS Restricted Mortality Files in the first column and 106,965 agency-year observations for the UCR Offenses Known Database
for the remaining columns. Outcomes are in log rates. All estimates control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, demographic controls, economic controls, and the size of
the police force in the area. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by the population represented by each cell.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.70
Table A.6: Estimates Using Alternative Approaches
Panel A: Restricting Sample to Areas Reporting Positive Counts in All Years
Motor
Homicide Homicide Sexual Aggravated Simple Vehicle Larceny
(NCHS Data) (UCR Data) Assault Assault Assault Robbery Theft Burglary Theft
Facilities Last Year -0.0024** -0.0018*** -0.0005 -0.0012** 0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0011** -0.0005 -0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002)
N 9145 4878 26772 67357 89722 39382 66040 93240 100647
Panel B: Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Estimates Using Full Sample
Motor
Homicide Homicide Sexual Aggravated Simple Vehicle Larceny
(NCHS Data) (UCR Data) Assault Assault Assault Robbery Theft Burglary Theft
Facilities Last Year -0.0026*** -0.0019*** -0.0006 -0.0012* 0.0000 -0.0011*** -0.0012** -0.0005* -0.0007
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006)
N 34326 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965
Panel C: Unweighted
Motor
Homicide Homicide Sexual Aggravated Simple Vehicle Larceny
(NCHS Data) (UCR Data) Assault Assault Assault Robbery Theft Burglary Theft
Facilities Last Year -0.0017* -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0014*** -0.0016*** 0.0000 0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
N 34326 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965 106965
Notes: Outcomes are in log rates. Whereas the results in prior tables add one to counts to avoid dropping observations for which the outcome would otherwise be undefined, Panel A instead focuses on
counties that never have a zero count for the specified outcome variable. Panel B transform counts using the inverse hyperbolic sine function as an alternative to adding one before taking the log such that




). Unweighted estimates from the prior tables are in Panel C. All estimates control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects,
demographic controls, economic controls, and the size of the police force in the area. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The regressions in
Panel A and B are weighted by the population represented by each cell.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.7: Summary Statistics for Control Variables
Mean Std Dev
Demographic Controls
%White Non-Hispanic 0.8 0.14
% Black Non-Hispanic 0.13 0.13
% Hispanic 0.17 0.17
% Male 0.49 0.01
% Ages 0-9 0.13 0.02
% Ages 10-19 0.14 0.02
% Ages 20-29 0.14 0.03
% Ages 30-39 0.14 0.02
% Ages 40-49 0.15 0.01
% Ages 50-59 0.13 0.02
% Ages 60-69 0.08 0.02
Economic Controls
Unemployment Rate 0.06 0.03
Total Firm Births 3649 6070
Law Enforcement Presence
Officers per 1,000 19.5 10.1
Notes: These summary statistics are from controls used in our agency-level analysis consisting of 106,965 observations. Demographic controls are
based on the National Cancer Institutes’s Surveillance Epidemiology and Ends Results (Cancer-SEER) program and are constructed at the county
level. Unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) and are at the county level. Total
firm births are based on the Census Bureau’s Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) and are constructed at the county level. Officers per 1,000 are
constructed using the FBI’s Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) at the agency level. All estimates are weighted by agency
population coverage.
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Table A.8: Estimated Effects on Log Homicide Rates, Lags and Lead
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NCHS Restricted Mortality Files
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0011*
(0.0005)
Facilities Last Year -0.0025*** -0.0017*** -0.0010* -0.0010*
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Facilities This Year -0.0019*** -0.0014*
(0.0006) (0.0008)
Facilities Next Year -0.0005
(0.0008)
N 34326 31875 34326 34326
UCR Offenses Known Database
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0004
(0.0004)
Facilities Last Year -0.0016*** -0.0013*** -0.0016*** -0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Facilities This Year -0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0007)
Facilities Next Year 0.0002
(0.0007)
N 106965 100494 106965 106965
Notes: Column 1 reproduces the estimate shown in Column 5 of Table A.2. Columns 2–4 are based on the same model with the inclusion of the
additional variables highlighted in the table. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The
regressions are weighted by county population for the NCHSMortality Files and are weighted by agency population coverage for the UCR Offenses
Known Database.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.9: Estimated Effects on Log Violent Crime Rates, Lags and Lead
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homicides
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0004
(0.0004)
Facilities Last Year -0.0016*** -0.0013*** -0.0016*** -0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Facilities This Year -0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0007)
Facilities Next Year 0.0002
(0.0007)
Sexual Assaults
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0002
(0.0005)
Facilities Last Year -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Facilities This Year 0.0005 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Facilities Next Year 0.0004
(0.0004)
Aggravated Assaults
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0017**
(0.0007)
Facilities Last Year -0.0012* 0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Facilities This Year -0.0004 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0009)
Facilities Next Year -0.0008
(0.0005)
Simple Assaults
Facilities 2 Years Ago 0.0002
(0.0004)
Facilities Last Year 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Facilities This Year 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Facilities Next Year 0.0003
(0.0003)
N 106965 100494 106965 106965
Notes: Column 1 reproduces the estimate shown in Column 5 of Table A.3. Columns 2–4 are based on the same model with the inclusion of the
additional variables highlighted in the table. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The
regressions are weighted by agency population coverage.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.10: Estimated Effects on Log Financially-Motivated Crime Rates, Lags and Lead
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Robbery Total
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0016***
(0.0003)
Facilities Last Year -0.0011*** 0.0002 -0.0007** -0.0007**
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Facilities This Year -0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Facilities Next Year -0.0003
(0.0003)
Motor Vehicle Theft
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0005
(0.0005)
Facilities Last Year -0.0012** -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Facilities This Year -0.0008 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Facilities Next Year -0.0005
(0.0004)
Burglary Total
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0006
(0.0004)
Facilities Last Year -0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Facilities This Year -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Facilities Next Year -0.0001
(0.0002)
Larceny Theft (no MVT)
Facilities 2 Years Ago -0.0005
(0.0009)
Facilities Last Year -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Facilities This Year -0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0016) (0.0022)
Facilities Next Year 0.0009
(0.0010)
N 106965 100494 106965 106965
Notes: Column 1 reproduces the estimate shown in Column 5 of Table A.4. Columns 2–4 are based on the same model with the inclusion of the
additional variables highlighted in the table. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The
regressions are weighted by agency population coverage.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.11: Estimated Effects of SAT Facilities on Log Homicide Rates
Omitting the Largest Areas Based on Population
Number of Counties/Agencies Omitted
0 1 5 10 20 50 100 200 500
Estimates Using NCHS Data, County-level Analysis
Facilities Last Year -0.0025*** -0.0021*** -0.0018** -0.0025*** -0.0010 -0.0007 0.0010 0.0019 -0.0046
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0033)
N 34326 34312 34256 34186 34049 33629 32929 31533 27335
Estimates Using UCR Data, Agency-level Analysis
Facilities Last Year -0.0016*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0013*** -0.0011*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0009** -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
N 106965 106951 106898 106834 106698 106317 105692 104397 100444
Notes: Each column corresponds to the number of counties (NCHS data) or agencies (UCR data) dropped from the estimating sample based on population size. The first column drops no counties/agencies
and presents the estimated effects of the full sample as reported in Column 5 of Table A.2. The second column shows estimated effects after dropping the largest county/agency from the sample. The
third column drops the top five counties/agencies, and so on. Outcomes are in log rates. All estimates control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, demographic controls,
economic controls, and the size of the police force in the area. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. The regressions are weighted by county
population when using the NCHS Mortality data and are weighted by agency population coverage when using the UCR Offenses Known data.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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Table A.12: Estimated Effects of SAT Facilities on Log Homicide Rates
Restricting the Sample to the Largest Areas Based on Population
Number of Counties/Agencies Included
20 50 100 200 500
Panel A: Weighted Estimates
Estimates Using NCHS Data, County-level Analysis
Facilities Last Year -0.0020** -0.0019*** -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0023***
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006)
N 168 504 1243 2679 6921
Estimates Using UCR Data, Agency-level Analysis
Facilities Last Year -0.0034 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0018** -0.0022***
(0.0030) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006)
N 144 421 1165 2454 6429
Panel B: Unweighted Estimates
Estimates Using NCHS Data, County-level Analysis
Facilities Last Year -0.0016 -0.0021*** -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0012
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)
N 168 504 1243 2679 6921
Estimates Using UCR Data, Agency-level Analysis
Facilities Last Year -0.0026 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0021***
(0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0005)
N 144 421 1165 2454 6429
Notes: Outcomes are in log rates. All estimates control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, demographic
controls, economic controls, and the size of the police force in the area. Each column corresponds to the number of counties (NCHS data) or
agencies (UCR data) used within the estimating sample based on population. Note that the inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects requires multiple
counties/agencies within each state. Thus, the actual number of counties/agencies is reduced further. For the NCHS data, the actual number of
counties used were 12, 36, 89, 191, and 495, respectively. For the UCR data, the actual number of agencies used were 11, 33, 92, 193, and
496, respectively. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the county and year levels are shown in parentheses. In Panel A the regressions
are weighted by county population when using the NCHS Mortality data and are weighted by agency population coverage when using the UCR
Offenses Known data.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX: UNION, PREMIUM COST, AND THE PROVISION OF HEALTH BENEFITS
B.1 Appendix Figures
Figure B.1: The Declining Provision of Health Plan among US Private Establishments, 1999-2014
Notes: The MEPS-IC shifted from a retrospective survey that collected data about the previous year to a current survey that asked questions about
current health plans. As such, we do not have any observations for 2007.
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B.2 Appendix Tables
Table B.1: Summary Statistics of the Analytical Sample
Mean S.D. Note Source
Outcome Variable
Health Plan 0.45 0.5 1= providing any health insurance; 0 otherwise MEPS-IC
Worker’s Bargaining Power
% Union (Estab-level) 1.76 12.03 Percent of employees at the establishment that are union members MEPS-IC
% Union (State-level) 0.14 0.07 Percent of the employees in the state that are members of a union CPS
or covered by a union
Right-to-work 0.38 0.49 1= having right-to-work laws; 0 otherwise Public
Premium Cost
Cost per Worker 6431 17160 Total establishment contribution to all health plans divided by the MEPS-IC, LBD
number of employees at each establishment
Firm Characteristics
Founding Period We use the earliest reported year for a firm between the MEPS-IC, MEPS-IC, LBD, BR
(1980 or Before) 0.18 0.38 LBD, and BR and difference that into the survey year
1981-1990 0.2 0.4
1991-2000 0.37 0.48
2001 or After 0.25 0.43
Firm Age 13.33 10.1 MEPS-IC, LBD, BR
Firm Employment Size 83.12 2641 Total workers for the firm, logged in the analysis MEPS-IC
Multi-unit Firm 0.06 0.24 1= the firm has more than one establishment; 0 otherwise MEPS-IC
Establishment Characteristics
Pay per Worker 3363 79660 Total salaries paid divided by the number of workers LBD
% Part-Time 27.91 35.62 Percent of employees working part-time MEPS-IC
% Female 45.11 36.67 Percent of employees that are women MEPS-IC
% Aged 50+ 28.07 33.16 Percent of employees aged 50 or older MEPS-IC
% Low-wage 31.53 39.24 Percent of employees earning at or below the 25th percentile MEPS-IC
Non-profit 0.09 0.28 1= non-profit; 0 otherwise
State Characteristics
% Unemployment 0.07 0.02 Percent of the state population that is unemployed CPS
% Below Poverty 0.13 0.03 Percent of the state population under the federal poverty lines CPS
Notes: Statistics are based on 240,000 establishment-year observations for all variables except for the costs per worker which is based on 120,000
establishment-year observations. MEPS-IC: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component; LBD: Longitudinal Business Database:
BR: Business Registrar; CPS: Current Population Survey
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Table B.2: Additive Logistic Regression Predicting the Provision of Health Insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Worker’s Bargaining Power
% Union (Estab-level) .0043*** 0.0008 .0040*** 0.0008 .0034*** 0.0008 .0033*** 0.0009
% Union (State-level) .5885* 0.304 .6150** 0.3051 .6938** 0.322 .7619** 0.3655
Right-to-work -.1563*** 0.0483 -.1609*** 0.0512 -.1757*** 0.065 -.2027** 0.085
Financial Factors
Cost per Worker*100% -.0510*** 0.0021
Cost per Worker*110% -.2031*** 0.0046
Cost per Worker*120% -.3739*** 0.0126
Firm Characteristics
Founding Period
1981-1990 .0804** 0.0399 .0823** 0.0407 .0884** 0.0431 .0998** 0.0451
1991-2000 .2123*** 0.0649 .2152*** 0.0664 .2251*** 0.0704 .2430*** 0.0735
2001 or After .1679** 0.0758 .1706** 0.0772 .1801** 0.0807 .1992** 0.0836
Firm Age .0403*** 0.0041 .0406*** 0.0041 .0416*** 0.0041 .0428*** 0.0042
Firm Age-squared -.0004*** 0.0001 -.0004*** 0.0001 -.0004*** 0.0001 -.0004*** 0.0001
Ln(Firm Emp. Size) -.0004*** 0.0001 -.0004*** 0.0001 -.0004*** 0.0001 -.0004*** 0.0001
Multi-unit Firm -.5932*** 0.0888 -.6236*** 0.0897 -.7024*** 0.0903 -.7620*** 0.0919
Establishment Characteristics
Ln(Pay per Worker) .4086*** 0.0164 .4159*** 0.0163 .4380*** 0.0159 .4607*** 0.0156
% Part-Time -.0160*** 0.0005 -.0162*** 0.0005 -.0167*** 0.0005 -.0174*** 0.0005
% Female .0027*** 0.0004 .0025*** 0.0004 .0021*** 0.0004 .0016*** 0.0004
% Aged 50+ .0009*** 0.0003 .0011*** 0.0003 .0016*** 0.0003 .0020*** 0.0004
% Low-wage -.0119*** 0.0005 -.0120*** 0.0005 -.0123*** 0.0005 -.0128*** 0.0005
Non-profit .6464*** 0.0364 .6567*** 0.0364 .6865*** 0.0371 .7197*** 0.0384
State Characteristics
% Unemployment -0.7752 1.137 -0.6878 1.16 -0.4309 1.268 -0.1938 1.457
% Below Poverty -1.052 0.8856 -1.019 0.8904 -0.8895 0.928 -0.7357 1.004
State Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Total observations for each regression is 240,000. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The regressions are weighted using the
sample weights provided by the MEPS-IC which are adjusted for non-response and post stratification. Stars indicate significance at the ten (*), five
(**), and one (***) percent levels.
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Table B.3: Multiplicative Logistic Regression Predicting the Provision of Health Insurance
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Worker’s Bargaining Power
% Union (Estab-level) 0.0025 0.0016 .0034*** 0.0008 .0034*** 0.0008
% Union (State-level) .6940** 0.3221 -0.0863 0.4724 .6889** 0.3209
Right-to-work -.1759*** 0.065 -.1760*** 0.0654 -0.1149 0.0978
Financial Factors
Cost per Worker*110% -.2034*** 0.0049 -.2178*** 0.0072 -.2000*** 0.0062
Interaction Terms
Cost*% Union (Estab-level) 0.0001 0.0002
Cost*% Union (State-level) .1018** 0.0479
Cost*Right-to-work -0.008 0.0074
State Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Total observations for each regression is 240,000. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level. The regressions are weighted using
the sample weights provided by the MEPS-IC which are adjusted for non-response and post stratification. Stars indicate significance at the ten (*),
five (**), and one (***) percent levels. The model specification for each regression is that same as the previous table with additional cost variables
included. Not all variable coefficient estimates are displayed.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX: THE ROLE OF EDUCATORS IN THE REPORTING OF CHILD
MALTREATMENT: CAUSAL EFFECTS OF SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
C.1 Appendix Figures
Figure C.1: Semimonthly Maltreatment Reports Initiated by Educators Averaged Across the
Years 2002-2015
Notes: Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on
Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) program. A child-report pairing counts as one report, thus, a report including two children counts as two reports.
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Figure C.2: Semimonthly Differences in Reports Initiated by Educators Between Ages Averaged
Across the Years 2002-2015
Notes: Six-Five shows the educator initiated reporting rates for children aged 6 differenced by the educator initiated reporting rates of children
aged 5. Seven-Six is the same but for ages seven and six. Five-year-olds in September are more likely to be enrolled in school than five-year-olds
in May. Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve
on Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) program. A child-report pairing counts as one report, thus, a report including two children counts as two reports.
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Figure C.3: Semimonthly Maltreatment Reports Initiated by Non-Educators Averaged Across the
Years 2002-2015
Notes: Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on
Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) program. A child-report pairing counts as one report, thus, a report including two children counts as two reports.
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Figure C.4: Semimonthly Maltreatment Reports Averaged Across the Years 2002-2015
Notes: The dotted lines segment the summer months from the school year. Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come
from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) program. A child-report pairing counts as one report,
thus, a report including two children counts as two reports.
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Figure C.5: School Enrollment Across the United States using State-Year Observations Averaged
Across the Years 2002-2015
Notes: School enrollment data are based on the American Community Survey 1-year estimates provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS-USA).
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Figure C.6: Semimonthly Maltreatment Reports for Children 3-5 Averaged Across the Years
2002-2015 Demeaned
Notes: School enrollment data are based on the American Community Survey 1-year estimates provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS-USA). Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National
Data Archieve on Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance,
Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) program. A child-report pairing counts as one report, thus, a report including two children counts as two
reports.
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Figure C.7: Semimonthly Maltreatment Reports Initiated by Educators Averaged Across the
Years 2002-2015 Using Only Single-Child Reports
Notes: Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on
Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) program. The population counts for this figure are the same as the previous figures as it is not possible to ascertain the
relevant population for reports involving only one child. Single-child reports account for around 30% of the original sample.
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Figure C.8: Semimonthly Maltreatment Reports Initiated by Non-Educators Averaged Across the
Years 2002-2015 Using Only Single-Child Reports
Notes: Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on
Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology,
and End Results (SEER) program. The population counts for this figure are the same as the previous figures as it is not possible to ascertain the
relevant population for reports involving only one child. Single-child reports account for around 30% of the original sample.
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Figure C.9: Semimonthly Maltreatment Reports Averaged Across the Years 2002-2015 Using
Only Single-Child Reports
Notes: The dotted lines segment the summer months from the school year. Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect
Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come
from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) program. The population counts for this figure are the
same as the previous figures as it is not possible to ascertain the relevant population for reports involving only one child. Single-child reports
account for around 30% of the original sample.
90
Figure C.10: Monthly Inpatient Reports of Maltreatment for Children Aged 3-12 Averaged
Across the Years 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012
Notes: All child maltreatment cases also include emotional abuse, cases marked as multiple types of abuse, and cases with external causes of
injury codes marked as being caused by maltreatment. Inpatient reports come from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Kids’
Inpatient Database (KID).
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Figure C.11: Monthly Mortalities for Children Aged 3-12 Averaged Across the Years 2002-2015,
Homicides and Maltreatment Deaths
Note: Mortality data comes from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Multiple Cause of Death Data.
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C.2 Appendix Tables
Table C.1: Summary Statistics, Percent of Maltreatment Report-Child Pairings by Reporter Type and Child Age
Child Age 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 3-12
Education Personnel 9.17 12.58 19.02 22.91 23.85 24.01 24.05 23.99 23.97 23.52 20.71
Social Services Personnel 10.44 10.26 9.83 9.78 9.83 9.93 10.04 10.19 10.39 10.77 10.15
Medical/Mental Health Personnel 11.20 10.72 10.29 10.15 10.26 10.43 10.61 10.78 11.11 11.74 10.73
Legal, Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice 20.20 18.60 16.75 15.84 15.50 15.43 15.54 15.65 15.98 16.53 16.60
Child Day/Substitute Care Provider 2.32 2.45 1.60 1.01 0.87 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.65 0.65 1.17
Alleged Victim 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.41 0.51 0.29
Parent 8.20 8.37 8.05 7.68 7.64 7.62 7.60 7.42 7.16 6.75 7.65
Other Relative, Friend, Neighbor 16.80 15.98 14.75 13.80 13.41 13.15 12.89 12.73 12.41 12.00 13.79
Alleged Perpetrator 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Anonymous 12.05 11.64 10.97 10.53 10.36 10.30 10.20 10.12 9.81 9.33 10.53
Other 9.36 9.11 8.44 8.01 7.96 8.00 7.98 8.02 8.02 8.11 8.30
Unknown or Missing 7.50 7.44 7.25 7.16 7.10 7.09 7.07 7.11 7.09 7.05 7.18
Notes: Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on Child Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Reports
from non-educators consist of all reporting entities except education personnel and unknown or missing.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics, Child Maltreatment and Enrollment
National Child Abuse and Negelct Data System American Community Survey
Daily child-report counts per 1,000 children Percent of
Reports from Reports From Yearly
Child Age All Reports Educators Non-Educators Enrollment
Three 0.161 0.014 0.137 0.329
(0.081) (0.016) (0.073) (0.088)
Four 0.160 0.018 0.131 0.584
(0.080) (0.019) (0.071) (0.092)
Five 0.162 0.029 0.123 0.839
(0.082) (0.026) (0.068) (0.057)
Six 0.159 0.035 0.116 0.967
(0.084) (0.030) (0.067) (0.016)
Seven 0.151 0.034 0.108 0.975
(0.080) (0.029) (0.063) (0.015)
Eight 0.142 0.032 0.102 0.978
(0.077) (0.028) (0.061) (0.0138)
Nine 0.134 0.030 0.095 0.980
(0.075) (0.027) (0.060) (0.013)
Ten 0.124 0.028 0.089 0.981
(0.071) (0.026) (0.056) (0.012)
Eleven 0.118 0.027 0.085 0.982
(0.069) (0.024) (0.055) (0.012)
Twelve 0.116 0.026 0.084 0.982
(0.070) (0.024) (0.055) (0.012)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Maltreatment reports come from the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System Child File, provided by the National Data Archieve on Child
Abuse and Neglect at Cornell University. Child population counts come from the National Cancer Institute’s Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) program. School enrollment data are
based on the American Community Survey 1-year estimates provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA).
94
Table C.3: Estimated Effects of School Attendance on Maltreatment Reporting After Reaching Schooling Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ages 3-12 Ages 3-12 Ages 3-12 Ages 4-6 Ages 4-7 Ages 4-8 Ages 4-9 Ages 3-6
School Attendance Starts at Age 5
School Year*Age 5+ 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.100* 0.115** 0.124*** 0.130*** 0.122**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.029)
School Attendance Starts at Age 6
School Year*Age 6+ 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.090 0.099* 0.104** 0.108** 0.117**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032)
N 3300 3300 3300 990 1320 1650 1980 1320
Age FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month & Year FEs No Yes - - - - - -
Month*Year FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the age-year-semimonthly level. The outcome variable for each regression is total maltreatment reports. Robust standard errors are two-way clustered at the child age and
quartly-by-year level. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table C.4: Estimated Effects of School Attendance on Maltreatment Reporting Using Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 4-6 Ages 4-7 Ages 4-8 Ages 4-9 Age 3-12
All Reports
School Year*Enroll% 0.283*** 0.252*** 0.283*** 0.285*** 0.346*** 0.380*** 0.400*** 0.412*** 0.369***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.019)
Mean Enrollment % 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 79.7 84.2 86.9 88.7 86.0
N 64169 64169 64169 64169 48128 64172 80207 96244 160386
Age FEs Yes Yes - - - - - - -
Month*Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes - - - - - - -
State*Age FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Year FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the state-age-year-semimonthly level. The outcome variable for each regression is total maltreatment reports. Results are two-way clustered at the state and year level.
Regressions on individual age groups were not significant. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table C.5: Estimated Effects of School Attendance Using Enrollment, Only Reports Involving One Child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 4-6 Ages 4-7 Ages 4-8 Ages 4-9 Age 3-12
All Reports
School Year*Enroll% 0.398*** 0.494*** 0.536*** 0.541*** 0.639*** 0.696*** 0.722*** 0.735*** 0.655***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.027)
Mean Enrollment % 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 79.7 84.2 86.9 88.7 86.0
N 63530 63530 63530 63530 47618 63382 79109 94790 157866
Age FEs Yes Yes - - - - - - -
Month*Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes - - - - - - -
State*Age FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Year FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the state-age-year-semimonthly level. The outcome variable for each regression is total maltreatment reports. Results are clustered at the state-level. The population
denominator for this table has not changed from the previous tables as it is not possible to ascertain the relevant population for reports involving only one child.
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Table C.6: Estimated Effects of School Attendance Using Enrollment, Adjusted School Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 4-6 Ages 4-7 Ages 4-8 Ages 4-9 Age 3-12
All Reports
Adjusted School Year*Enroll% 0.305*** 0.248*** 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.395*** 0.440*** 0.468*** 0.484*** 0.430***
(0.044) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.022)
Mean Enrollment % 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 79.7 84.2 86.9 88.7 86.0
N 50230 50230 50230 50230 38046 50729 63406 76086 126786
Age FEs Yes Yes - - - - - - -
Month*Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes - - - - - - -
State*Age FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Year FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the state-age-year-semimonthly level. The outcome variable for each regression is total maltreatment reports. Results are clustered at the state-level. The population
denominator for this table has not changed from the previous tables as it is not possible to ascertain the relevant population for reports involving only one child.
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Table C.7: Estimated Effects of School Attendance on Maltreatment Reporting Using Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 4-6 Ages 4-7 Ages 4-8 Ages 4-9 Age 3-12
Reports by Educators
School Year*Enroll% 0.932*** 0.843*** 0.859*** 0.860*** 0.996*** 1.023*** 1.010*** 1.003*** 0.889***
(0.023) (0.068) (0.076) (0.072) (0.098) (0.096) (0.089) (0.085) (0.061)
Reports by Non-Educators
School Year*Enroll% 0.029 -0.003 0.016 0.018 0.016 0.030 0.042* 0.048** 0.067***
(0.026) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.014)
Mean Enrollment % 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 79.7 84.2 86.9 88.7 86.0
N 64169 64169 64169 64169 48128 64172 80207 96244 160386
Age FEs Yes Yes - - - - - - -
Month*Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes - - - - - - -
State*Age FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Year FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the state-age-year-semimonthly level. The outcome variable for each regression is total maltreatment reports initiated by educators for the top panel and total maltreatment
reports initiated by non-educators in the bottom panel. Results are two-way clustered at the state and year level. Regressions on individual age groups were not significant. Significance levels at 1%, 5%,
and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
99
Table C.8: Estimated Effects of School Attendance on Maltreatment Reporting Adjusting for Measurement Error, Children Ages 3-12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
School Year*Age 5+ School Year*Enroll%
Total Reports
0.170*** 0.341*** 0.205*** 0.413*** 0.369*** 0.655*** 0.430*** 0.771***
(0.021) (0.042) (0.026) (0.050) (0.019) (0.027) (0.022) (0.033)
Reports by Educators
0.267*** 0.551*** 0.531*** 1.088*** 0.889*** 2.569*** 1.264*** 4.040***
(0.035) (0.107) (0.061) (0.163) -0.063 (0.281) (0.093) (0.376)
Reports by Non-Educators
0.028*** 0.078*** 0.029** 0.082*** 0.067*** -0.029 0.067*** -0.051
(0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.021) -0.014 (0.054) (0.016) (0.065)
N 3300 3300 2610 2610 160386 157866 124927 124927
Measurement Error Corrections
Enrollment % No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Single-Child Reports No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted School Year No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the age-year-semimonthly level for the regressions in columns (1)–(4). These regressions estimate Equation 4.1 defining the schooling-age to be 5 and including age and
month-by-year fixed effects. Observations are at the state-age-year-semimonthly level for the regressions in columns (5)–(8). These regressions estimate Equation 4.2 including month-by-year,
state-by-age, and age-by-year fixed effects. Results are two-way clustered at the age and quarter-by-year level for columns (1)–(4). Results are two-way clustered at the state and year level for columns
(5)–(8). Outcome variables for each panel from top to bottom are total maltreatment reports, total reports initiated by educators, and total reports initiated by non-educators. Significance levels at 1%, 5%,
and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table C.9: Estimated Effects of School Attendance on Maltreatment Reporting Using Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 3-6 Ages 4-6 Ages 4-7 Ages 4-8 Ages 4-9 Age 3-12
Substantiated Reports
School Year*Enroll% 0.386*** 0.155*** 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.267*** 0.300*** 0.317*** 0.334*** 0.295***
(0.032) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.042) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.022)
Child Put Into Foster Care
School Year*Enroll% -0.355*** 0.142*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.227*** 0.244*** 0.237*** 0.251*** 0.216***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.037) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.016)
Child Removed From Home
School Year*Enroll% -0.368*** 0.143*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.221*** 0.246*** 0.239*** 0.254*** 0.218***
(0.032) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.016)
Mean Enrollment % 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 79.7 84.2 86.9 88.7 86.0
N 64169 64169 64169 64169 48128 64172 80207 96244 160386
Age FEs Yes Yes - - - - - - -
Month*Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes - - - - - - -
State*Age FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Year FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the state-age-year-semimonthly level. Outcome variables for each panel from top to bottom are total substantiated maltreatment reports, total reports that led to the child being
placed into foster care, and total reports that led to the child being removed from the home. Results are two-way clustered at the state and year level. Regressions on individual age groups were not
significant. Significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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